


Summer 2010

Cooperative Strategies on Parallel Tracks: The NEPAD and AGOA Initiatives

Guelmbaye Ngarsandje
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds

 Part of the [African Studies Commons](#), [Growth and Development Commons](#), [International Relations Commons](#), [Public Policy Commons](#), and the [Regional Economics Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Ngarsandje, Guelmbaye. "Cooperative Strategies on Parallel Tracks: The NEPAD and AGOA Initiatives" (2010). Master of Arts (MA), thesis, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/gzfc-w373
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/80

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES ON PARALLEL TRACKS: THE NEPAD AND
THE AGOA INITIATIVES

by

Guelmbaye Ngarsandje
License 2001, University of N'Djamena
Maîtrise 2004, University of N'Djamena

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY

August 2010

Approved by:

David Earnest (Director)

Francis Adams (Member)

Regina Karp (Member)

ABSTRACT

COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES ON PARALLEL TRACKS: THE NEPAD AND THE AGOA INITIATIVES

Guelmbaye Ngarsandje
Old Dominion University, 2010
Director: Dr. David Earnest

In July 2001, at the 37th of the former Organization of African Unity, African heads of states launched the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), a combination of the Omega Plan from Abdoulaye Wade and The Millennium African Renaissance Partnership initiated by Thabo Mbeki, respectively presidents of Senegal and South Africa. This was an achievement of tasks given by their peers in Algiers in 1999. Previously to that, the Clinton administration initiated the African Growth and Opportunity Act passed in law in 1998. Though the two programs aim at African development, they did not take in account each other.

This analysis seeks for common patterns and conditions of cooperation between the two to enhance African development. It is underlined by an analysis of previous strategies set to help Africa develop and the difference that makes the NEPAD a promising initiative. It also looks at the AGOA strengths and weaknesses and the purposes for which it was initiated. Though they have to lead Africa on the track of development, they did not work together due to differences in speed and characteristics of people in charge in Africa and in the United States. The study shows also that some important pieces are left aside despite their mention in the programs' frameworks and administration structures. These pieces are gender approach and the inclusion of the African diaspora in these programs. The work takes in account the latter much important

to the topic. However, there are still ways for these programs to cooperate if some conditions to overcome obstacles such as corruption, instability, bad governance, and lack of transparency are met. These conditions are the object of some suggestions made in this paper.

To all the people hoping for a better Africa where it will be pleasant to live and all
Africans who struggle for their daily living.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank everyone without whom this study would not be possible. First of all, I thank the members of my committee who, despite their responsibilities and occupation accepted to sit, evaluate and approve my work. My thanks go to Dr. David Earnest for his helpful advice, to Dr. Regina Karp for her help to overcome my literature review and Dr. Francis Adams for his critical questions during the defense that helped single out important points. I am grateful to my family for their sacrifice for my education, especially my deceased mother for being my first teacher despite her lower level of education, and my children and their mother for their support despite the distance. I also acknowledge friends and classmates with whom I discussed my topic and who made helpful observations, mainly Diane Mercure, Komi Kpodzoh, Omar Carla Hawthorne, Michael Shakelford, and John Yuhas, my conversation partners Michael Ventry from Western Illinois University and Michael Brown from Old Dominion University for helping me improve my English. May God bless you all.

I will not forget the Fulbright Scholarship and the Department of State of the United States of America without which I cannot be in the United States and do this work.

Finally but not the least, my thanks to God who always gives me the strength I needed for all the difficulties and obstacles I ran into during my research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
HISTORICAL LEGACIES	3
NEW OPPORTUNITIES – NEW ISSUES	11
PROBLEMATIQUE AND METHODOLOGY	13
ADDED VALUE	16
II. LITERATURE REVIEW	18
THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT DEBATE	20
NEPAD’S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES	27
AGOA’S PURPOSE AND INTENTION	34
AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE GLOBAL ARENA	38
CONCLUSION	44
III. BEHIND OTHER GAME PLAYERS	49
DEVELOPMENT THEORIES TO FIT AFRICA BUT NOT THE REVERSE	49
MISLEADING BASELINE AND GRIEVANCES/REMORSES	57
COMMON PATTERNS AND CONDITIONS	63
OPPORTUNITIES AND PARTNERSHIP IN PARALLEL	68
MISSING PIECE TO LEADING TO SUCCESS	71
IV. CONCLUSION	80
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND APPLIED STRATEGIES	80
RAILWAY SIDES STRATEGIES	87
SUGGESTIONS	92
LIMITS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS	97
REFERENCES	99
VITA	107

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1 U.S.-African Trade profile.....	66

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This paper analyzes and understands the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), a development program that seems to be still-born according to many observers and analysts of African scenes. Towards the end of the 1990s, almost simultaneously, the United States of America developed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Africa Union developed the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) whose aims are similar. However, neither of them coordinates with the other one. My concern is to look for their similarities and frame a cooperative plan that could improve both programs and the policies they intend to implement.

This analysis will seek any resemblances, similarities and connections with the program set up by the United States in order to increase trade with Africa – the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

People speak about Africa's development with grins in their faces and skepticism: it is the continent of poverty, wars, conflicts and dictatorship. This statement does not spare Africans themselves if they are not in power or part of the regime in any country. Few Africans are proud of their countries because of acts posed by their leaders that show they care less for their peoples. Most are reluctant to give credit to their leaders because of there is no democracy and less freedom of any kind, politically speaking.

Africa's development seems a utopia rather than a realistic objective. Most intellectual Africans think Africa will never develop or will do so in millennia, meaning it is not worth speaking about development in Africa. Many "efforts" from the West, mainly the former colonial powers, were made to improve peoples' situations. From the colonial acts to fights for independence and after independence, much more has been done to settle the question of African development. According to Thomas Pakenham, David Livingstone, one of the eminent earlier missionaries in Africa, called from beyond his grave for conquest in Africa in the name of "'3Cs': Commerce, Christianity and Civilization."¹ Before that crusade, Arabs and Swahili from the Zanzibar Island were trading slaves' trade in Africa.

History also tells us before Europeans came in contact with Africans, Arabic caravans already circulated in Africa to seek slaves. Beside the slaves' trade with Zanzibar, Arabs were also launching a religious conquest throughout Africa that led them to Senegal and Mali at the west coast of Africa. On top of the Arabs, mostly because of the Islamic conquests, the discovery of Africa by Europeans brought what is called imperialism or colonialism, though the two notions are slightly different. Because imperialism led to the colonization of Africa, less difference is made between the two words. In effect while colonization refers to oppression and abuse, imperialism is an economic expansion by taking advantage on another society or community. Thus, the continent has been undergoing struggle for development for centuries. Not to say less, colonizers also tried to "develop" the continent according to their ways. However, much

¹ Pakenham, Thomas. *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912*. New York: Avon Books, 1992: 141.

needs be said when African natives had taken over the lead of their peers after decolonization.

Scholars, politicians, and other concerned people mostly blame colonization, imperialism and politicians to be the cause of Africa's underdevelopment. Despite efforts made after independence by former colonial powers and new elites to improve the continent either collectively or by country, nothing much is done. From the creation of the Organization of African Unity to the reform to Africa Union, African leaders have been trying strategies, programs, policies and organizations to boost its development with less success.

Nevertheless, this analysis and research of similarities requires a brief background of the continent's historical legacies, the steering given to Africa by his children, Africans themselves, and the new issues that, whether they want it or not, African leaders face. A clear explanation of the methodology suitable in such a research will follow.

HISTORICAL LEGACIES

Most of the blame for African underdevelopment is directed towards imperialism and colonization. Less is said about the pre-colonial epoch. The reproach goes from the spoliation of resources to slavery. Whether western colonial powers reduced the work force that could help Africa develop or refused access to Africans to their own resources in order to use and develop European countries, these claims forget the pre-colonial era when Africa first contacted Arab civilization. As Chapurukha M. Kusimba points out, the human trade was alongside merchandise for more than two millennia.² Thus, many

²Kusimba, Chapurukha M. "Archaeology of Slavery in East Africa." *The African Archaeological Review* 21, no. 2 (2004): 59-88.

historians and writers forget this aspect also submitted Africans to exploitation and oppression. However, in the light of the most told and blamed history of Africa, namely colonization, it is better to focus the context of this work on it and set out the struggles of independence fought by Africans. Was it the real source of the underdevelopment as some people think ?³ This research will build upon those contextual questions.

Because Africans were not familiar with Latin script until later through the 'civilization' by Europeans, they did not write Africa's history nor related the oppression they underwent. It was Europeans and some external observers from Asia or other competitors that help new generations learn what happened in the past. After the wake of few of them that led the countries after independence, the literature was more focused on defending the dignity and the pride of the Black people than on tracking back sufferings underwent by the first people to welcome European invaders. Aimé Césaire, Leopold Sédar Senghor, Camara Laye, Ousmane Sembène, Ahmadou Kourouma, Olympe Bély-Quenum, to name a few, were more concerned with washing out the dirty clichés made about Africans. However, European scholars and historians themselves depicted and described what Africans underwent during the colonization period. For Walter Rodney , it was the excuse found by the bourgeois facing the accusation of having impoverished the continent that pushed them to recognize what they did wrong to the continent, though they weighed it and made biased conclusion affirming a surplus of the good over the

³ Ake, Claude. *A Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Longman Inc., 1981.

Amin, Samir. *Afrique: Exclusion Programmée Ou Renaissance*. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005.

Wrong, Michela. *I Didn't Do It for You: How the World Used and Abused a Small African Nation*. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005.

Mazrui, Ali Al'Amin, Christophe Wondji, and The Unesco International Scientific Committee for the Drafting of a General History of Africa. *General History of Africa. Vol. 8, Africa since 1935*. Paris; Oxford; Berkeley, Calif: Unesco ; James Currey ; University of California Press, 1998.

bad.⁴ Because it was not only philanthropic motives that brought Europeans to Africa but mostly competition with the Arabs,⁵ they had no interest in fully promoting the continent for the sake of Africans but instead for the interest of the metropolis that sent them over there. What we should say here is that the colonial heritage of Africa plays an important role in analyzing politics, the economy, or any field of interest. Many literature pieces link underdevelopment to colonization of countries;⁶ therefore, if we put aside the impacts, effects and influence of colonization in the actual state of African countries, our research cannot give much explanation. We should ask ourselves whether these influences affect leaders today conduct any kind of policy toward Africa in general or not.

If the search to expand the capitalist markets had brought Europeans to Africa, the fact that they met people with fewer infrastructures, fewer political and economic structures, the relationship changed from a cooperative to a dominative one. Because pioneers thought Africans were “primitives”, the political leaders who backed those missions in Africa brought in the capitalist expansion the civilization missions carried. In order to implement fully those ideas, France for example mixed religious and political strategies to overcome the resistance it found in Africa. According to Henry Labouret, the French were mostly concerned to assimilate these “savages” to their cultures. In addition, Labouret stated that the way they conducted their colonization through an

⁴ Rodney, Walter. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publ. [u.a.], 1973.

⁵ Cameron, Verney Lovett. "Across Africa, Vol I." London: Daldy, Isbister & Co., 1877.

⁶ Berg, Robert J., Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Strategies Committee on African Development, Relations Council on Foreign, and Council Overseas Development. *Strategies for African Development : A Study for the Committee on African Development Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

administration, which took care of their interests overseas, explained the type of relationship they entertain nowadays with their former colonies.⁷

That said, the colonizer came to Africa in order to cooperate and trade, but the natives were not those with whom they could do business. Thus, it changed the order to domination. They subjected the natives to their rules through force and coercion. The Europeans were called the white gods until Africans discovered they were not immortal; during World War II they saw Europeans dying during combat.

Thus, the main objectives of colonization were to exploit natural resources in Africa. Because there were many competitors, they shared the continent among them. This division is what is called balkanization and many arguments point to it as the cause of African underdevelopment. Yet, those accusation could be wrong but “there is a fair amount of truth in [these] argument[s].”⁸

Because Africans realized they were mistreated and that the white gods were no longer what they thought, the struggles for the freedom of their countries started. Upon the end of the World War II, educated black and Africans who paid allegiance to the metropolis – France, the United Kingdom, Spain and other European countries – claimed the sovereignty of their lands. The fashionable word was *independence*. Unlike what happened in the Americas where those who claim the independence are from the metropolis, Africans are natives who wanted their freedom and autonomy. Haiti is

⁷ Labouret, Henri. "France's Colonial Policy in Africa." *Journal of the Royal African Society* 39, no. 154 (1940): 22-35.

⁸ Amin, Samir. *Maldevelopment : Anatomy of a Global Failure*, Studies in African Political Economy. Tokyo; London; Atlantic Highlands, N.J., USA: United Nations University Press ; Zed Books, 1990.

recognized as having given the example.⁹ These struggles went over fifteen years for French colonies whose independence was disguised under the terms of gifts to the peoples who have been helpful to France and England and helped them overcome German Nazism. However, before this independence became reality, many African natives had lost their lives. Most of them stood up against the colonists' oppression and called for a united Africa. Among them were Julius Nyerere from Tanzania, Kwame Nkruma from Ghana, and Sékou Touré from Guinea, to name leading figures.

Unfortunately, independence was not the beginning of development but rather the beginning of other struggles full of complex webs: social, political, administrative and economic. As matter of fact, it was not really a gift. It was a strategy to stop the fight and put trustworthy people in charge to defend the interests of the Europeans masters who in the past traded not only in humans but goods too. Those goods were mostly natural resources that they could use at that time. African independence was a masquerade to pursue the interest of the dominant countries, especially concerning France.¹⁰ Colonialism, as it did to the Americas,¹¹ had dispossessed Africa from not only its natural resources and sons but also the inner power to rule itself. Beside new leaders, there were and are still special advisors from the former colonial powers to assist.

⁹ Strang, David. *Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987*. S.I.: [s.n.], 1991.

Geggus, DP. *Haitian Revolutionary Studies*: Indiana Univ Pr, 2002.

Magloire, G. "Ambassadors at Dawn: Haitian Thinkers in the French Colonial Context of the 19th and 20th Centuries: The Example of Jean Price-Mars (1876--1969)." New York University, 2005.

Dubois, L. *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution*: Belknap Press, 2005.

¹⁰ Joly, Eva, and Judith Perrignon. *La Force Qui Nous Manque*. Paris: Arènes, 2007.

¹¹ Harris, Cole. "How Did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 94, no. 1 (2004): 165-82.

In fact, the metropolis had put in place leaders who could rule in their favor and who had no legitimacy.¹² They built infrastructure to serve areas where they produce the agricultural and mineral goods their countries needed.¹³ Products such as cocoa, cotton, sugar that could not be produced as much as people in the metropolis needed because of inadequate climate were produced in Africa and shipped in France, United Kingdom and other European countries. Those facts continued to exist until 1980s, though the countries subjectively established by European rulers through arbitrary boundaries were declared sovereign and independent. Within those boundaries defended by Africans at the price of death¹⁴ were, and are still, placed people indebted to European leaders who gave them power over the others.

In order to help those “hired men” in place to serve their purposes, the former colonial powers did not lack ideas and strategies at all. In the meantime, Africans who needed a real liberation rose against the European oppressors, those who really understood what Africans needed. Unfortunately, for them, they did not belong to the European royal courts and did not play the European games. They challenged the European authorities, laws and rules. However, knowing they would lose the lands if they did not take in account certain claims of those unwelcome players, the European administrators in African lands sorted out ideas that could serve their purposes and set up strategies and policies in order to “help” new leaders in place.

First, the liberators emphasized an agricultural economy that failed to help the continent because it “remained trapped in the old colonial (and racist!) prejudice that

¹² Maathai, Wangari. *The Challenge for Africa*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2009.

¹³ Ake, Claude. *A Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Longman Inc., 1981.

¹⁴ MacKenzie, John M. *The partition of Africa, 1880-1900 and European imperialism in the nineteenth century, Lancaster pamphlets*. London; New York: Methuen, 1983.

Africa was not ready either for industry, or for serious modernization of its agricultural and that from the outset an extensive approach is the only one possible.”¹⁵ On top of those agricultural policies and approaches, other strategies were “suggested” to the new independent countries. It was just a means to control these leaders and monitor their ways of ruling the states. For Samir Amin, at a failure of each policy, strategy or program, the former colonial power developed another and turned Africa into an space for experimental policies .¹⁶

If African leaders after the independence struggles were mostly dictators and supported by former colonial powers to safeguard the colonizers’ interests, colonial interests were not the only concerns. Those dictators also received support from the United States who has no colony in Africa. The Cold War largely explains this support to the African dictators. The hostility between the capitalist and the communist blocks helped those dictators play the superpowers against each other. From Idi Amin Dada (Uganda) to Bedel Bokassa (Central African Republic) through Hisseine Habré (Chad) and Mobutu Sesseko Wazabanga (Zaire), African dictators used the two blocks to strengthen their position in power for decades. Others, cleverer enough to pay obedience to the former colonial powers – Houphouët Boigny (Ivory Coast), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Omar Bongo (Gabon) for example – stayed in power longer than expected. Countries were ruled without a constitutional base until the rush to democracy after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Then, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the need for democracy called for less support to the dictators and a succession of coups and

¹⁵ Amin, Samir. *Maldevelopment : anatomy of a global failure, Studies in African political economy*. Tokyo; London; Atlantic Highlands, N.J., USA: United Nations University Press ; Zed Books, 1990: 24.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

rebellions threw out the dictators who were not keen to change just at the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, coercive policies replaced supportive policies. Aid, which was given without conditions, began to include notions such as democracy, transparency, governance and human rights. Deprived of their source of easy money and enrichment, African leaders turned to set up programs that seem to be saving solutions in 2001. They changed the name of their common organization – the former Organization of African Unity - to another one – the actual African Union – and initiated the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). However, a closer look leads to a copy-and-paste of one or other policy that these leaders had previously attempted to boost Africa's development or a mixing of some of them.

Therefore, a look at any policy and any strategy of development in Africa is necessary. If Amin's book published in 1990 questions development strategies in Africa, recent publications still make merely the same statements about programs and policies in Africa. These publications question the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), the Reinforced Adjustment Program (RSAP) and even the creation of the Organization of African Unity. Their questioning addresses also the change that happened to this organization during the last decade of 20th century, including the setting up of the New Partnership of Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the name change to African Union .¹⁷

¹⁷ Riddell, Barry. "Nepad and the Future of Economic Policy in Africa (Review)." *African Studies Review* 51, no. 3 (2008): 207-09.

Blame, Ekoué. "Nepad: 'We Cannot Fail'." *New African -London- IC Magazines Limited*, no. 490 (2009): 60-61.

Akukwe, Chinua. "Africa, Nepad, and the G-8." *World Press Review*. 49, no. 10 (2002): 8.

Amoako, K. Y. "Systemwatch - Nepad: Making Individual Bests a Continental Norm." *UN chronicle*. 40, no. 1 (2003): 25.

Biswas, Aparajita. "Nepad: Forum for Growth and Unity." *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, no. 8 (2004): 793-96.

Such questions pose the problem of accuracy but do not interrogate what are other possibilities among the programs and strategies in order to enhance cooperation and improvement of development.

NEW OPPORTUNITIES – NEW ISSUES

With the end of the Cold War, western countries that sustained Africa changed policies towards the dictators. Thus, in order to comply with the new trend, African Heads of State and leaders also changed the deal. The first step was to initiate a seeming African heads of states' program to save the continent, and started in 2000 in Algeria, during the 36th summit of heads of states, when African leaders decided to initiate a program that could help them tackle the questions of "poverty and underdevelopment"¹⁸ throughout the African continent. Other peers approved this initiative, after examination of two propositions from Thabo Mbeki (South Africa) and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal), the following year in Zambia. NEPAD is the fusion of two programs; the African Renaissance Millennium Partnership and the Omega Plan. In the first three articles of the framework, the initiators' concerns of the program are set out clearly:

Historically accession to the institutions of the international community, the credit and aid binomial has underlined the logic of African development. Credit has led to the debt deadlock which, from installment to rescheduling, still exists and hinders the growth of African countries. The limits of this option have been reached. Concerning the other element of the binomial – aid – we can also note

Bobo, B. F. "A Research Agenda for the Nepad Initiative: A Note." *Journal of Third World Studies*. 23, no. 1 (2006): 75-86.

Ilorah, Richard. "Nepad: The Need and Obstacles." *African Development Review* 16, no. 2 (2004): 223-51.

M. Makinda, Samuel, and F. Wafula Okumu. *The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance*. New York: Routledge, 2008.

¹⁸ African Union, The Heads of State Implementation Committee of. "The New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad)." In *Office of the Special Adviser on Africa: United nations: The African Union Heads of State Implementation Committee*, 2001: 1.

the reduction of private aid and the upper limit of public aid, which is below the target set in the 1970s (art. 3) .¹⁹

Unfortunately, a careful look at the third article shows the real cause of the initiative. Globally, because developed countries had reduced the aid provided to African countries and this increases debts towards international organizations – especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – it was time to innovate in order to meet the international order requirements. Other than the previous fields of concerns, infrastructures and telecommunications technology figure in the list. However, the leaders orientated the financing of this program towards external sources, which could lead to a remake of previous strategies and policies to enhance African development.

In the meantime, the United States tried to help the continent that it only protected to prevent it from allying with the former Soviet Union by developing a trade program. This program is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). It was under the Clinton administration that research to enhance Africa's development took the peak. From 1990 to 1997, the United States Administration sought strategies and policies and, finally, it developed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which is the centerpiece of this policy. It emphasizes trade with sub-Saharan Africa .²⁰ This program composes the basis of trade exchange between African countries and the United States with restriction on some goods.

Nevertheless, though the AGOA precedes the NEPAD and provides opportunity to African countries, the NEPAD framework made little mention of it rather than fully

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Guseh, J., and E. Oritsejafor. "The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 10, no. 1 (2009): 123-42.

integrating it and giving more opportunities to businesspersons in Africa. It should for example draw a pattern of integrative cooperation between the NEPAD and the AGOA by outlining the process and ways of cooperation that could strengthen negotiations between Africans and Americans businesspersons. Although English-speaking countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Ethiopia take advantage of the program, most African countries remain in the dark about the AGOA.

I will describe more the programs and analyze them in following chapters. The concern of this study, as said, is to find similarities and sketch a possible framework for an eventual cooperation.

PROBLEMATIQUE AND METHODOLOGY

This work does not seek to counter or judge previous works on NEPAD and AGOA. Much is written on the subjects and critics are plenty within the African analysis literature. Nonetheless, less of this literature tries to compare them and find an eventual link or missing piece of these strategies. My research seeks to answer three questions based upon assumptions that accompanied them.

First, even though NEPAD sounds like an innovation and a self-determination tool for African leaders, is it a real innovation or a copy of previous programs put altogether? When the organization of African Unity announced it, praises and claims of autonomy underlined the program. Nevertheless, after ten years of existence, observers and others mindsets ²¹ think NEPAD exists by name only. Because effects and

²¹ Blame, Ekoué. "Nepad: 'We Cannot Fail'." *New African -London- IC Magazines Limited*, no. 490 (2009): 60-61.

Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004.

implementation encounter obstacles due to lack of main basic conditions such as political stability, security and good governance, scholars and others observers believe the takeoff will not be soon while for politicians and those who have the responsibility to implement the program, it is dynamic and progressing. This question suggests the NEPAD just brought up ideas and practices made since African countries' independence but have not helped reach the level of development aimed by Africans.

The second question toward this program concerns resources to sustain the program. How can a program that depends mostly on foreign resources (diasporas and foreign aid) failed to integrate the diasporas' forces and foreign policies towards the continent? The framework laid out many domains which the program should emphasize in order to enhance African development and integration. However, neither the European program – the African Pacific and Caribbean agreements called Cotonou agreements – nor the AGOA is integrated into the framework. This shows what is, in Kabou's terms, self-pride and the will to dislike all western influences or policies and to claim self determination .²² Thus, African heads of state did “innovate” to meet requirements of their partners from the North so that those partners will not find other persons willing to serve their agenda and overthrow them from the power they held. NEPAD and African

Akukwe, Chinua. "Africa, Nepad, and the G-8." *World Press Review*. 49, no. 10 (2002): 8.

Amoako, K. Y. "Systemwatch - Nepad: Making Individual Bests a Continental Norm." *UN chronicle*. 40, no. 1 (2003): 25.

Biswas, Aparajita. "Nepad: Forum for Growth and Unity." *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, no. 8 (2004): 793-96.

Bobo, B. F. "A Research Agenda for the Nepad Initiative: A Note." *Journal of Third World Studies*. 23, no. 1 (2006): 75-86.

Ilorah, Richard. "Nepad: The Need and Obstacles." *African Development Review* 16, no. 2 (2004): 223-51.

²² Kabou, Axelle. *Et Si L'Afrique Refusait Le Développement*. Condé-sur-Noireau: L'Harmattan, 1991.

Unity were not inner decision but strategies to satisfy the western partners who required changes in order to sustain African heads of states.

Finally, the question linking the two programs is to unveil similarities and domains where they could be integrated to enhance African development for either individual businesspersons or the states themselves. Where do these programs meet and how could African leaders integrate them into each other? Is there any feasible frame to join their goals and make them more visible? A closer look at the objectives of NEPAD allows singling out the concerns to bring more resources in the continent and encourage development. A similar observation applies to AGOA through its pillars. Ways to enhance both programs exist and could be enforced if certain conditions are met.

In order to answer these questions the methodology will encompass areas such as politics, economy and security. Moreover, the globalization approach is necessary and broadly, international political economy seems to be a suitable framework. Rather than attempting to solve missing points in the NEPAD, I aim to make a comparative study to find similarities and assert that NEPAD and AGOA could be compelled in order to reach their common goal that is African development. Otherwise, without any coordination and joint efforts the aim is useless and cannot be completed during the time frame defined by each of them.

As a research, I will use the common methodology, which encompasses the empirical research and a qualitative approach, though I will integrate quantitative elements if necessary. This part of the study will focus on policies and strategies to enhance Africa's development. Those theories, policies, strategies and approaches run from the time Africa became a set of different countries, divided by many aspects that go

from religious one to spoken languages until nowadays. In the following pages, I will focus on those characteristics that adversely affect Africa's development and the failure of approaches, strategies and policies. A look at what causes failure and success of some of them will also be of great interest.

From this frame of analysis, each of the programs will be the main concern for this work. The study will look for misleading elements and similarities that NEPAD should have integrated but have not yet done so.

A concluding chapter will frame the joint plan and sketch possibilities for catching up in order to assert and emphasize the fact that each program's initiators need rethink them. Because in their documents they seem dynamic, it is important to look for cooperative opportunities rather than individual integration of one in each other.

ADDED VALUE

Most of the works I read so far analyze each of the programs separately in order to find technical mistakes or to assert their impracticability. These works focus on elements of success or failure without expanding the research to call for cooperative approaches between the two programs or incorporation of one of other. My focus takes into account these considerations and adds another that is the cooperative approach:

African countries need foreign direct investment and developed countries need to expand their economic horizon seeking for new markets. Moreover, with the rise of non-state actors that threaten stability and security, underdeveloped countries remain the main areas of recruitment of activists and terrorists alike who threaten the world stability. Cooperation is the only and suitable way to settle this matter. Examples are given by Iraq and Afghanistan that force and coercion are not definitive solutions. If the world needs to

move forth and do not leave Africa behind – to use Thomas Friedman’s expression ²³ – any effort made by African leaders deserve support and acknowledgement whether they display a repetition or innovation.

²³ Friedman, Thomas. *The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the 21st Century*. New York: Cambria, 2007.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Economic development theories have not reached consensus during decades to understand African development. From external to internal perspectives, each tendency has its own understanding of why Africa cannot develop. For Africans, blames are on imperialism/colonization that impoverished the continent and the current states that derive from those colonial powers which will never accept that Africa takes off. Another tendency is from the outside viewers. Most of them think Africa needs to take its own responsibility on its development and the West needs not be involved as policymakers for it. However, another side argues that the amount of aid provided to Africa is not enough to enhance its development. Others again think that because of the disparities of Africa's characteristics it is hard to set a common policy for its development; though until now, there have not been any notable results of these policies.

In effect, since their independence, African countries are trying to get rid of their cycles of economic and political crises without notable progress. Despite the amount of money given or driven by programs and project to help African countries develop, it is still difficult to obtain the expected results even though the institutions that run the programs think they have reached these and accuse the bad governance in Africa for programs failures .¹ After a “seeming”² support of the colonial power came the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), indexed by all tendencies to be a source of more

¹ Sachs, Jeffrey. *The End of Poverty : Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.

² Though British support to their colonies towards autonomy is real, French use these supports to yield on their own interests in their colonies.

impoverishment of Africa, economists from the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) believe it has been successful. From this sea of thoughts and talks, after many attempts, African leaders came up under the Organization of African Unity³ to create the New Partnership of African Development (NEPAD sometimes labeled New Partnership of Africa's Development) that is called their ownership of their continent's development. Focusing on economic growth, NEPAD aims to integrate Africa in the global economy and enhance its development. Awhile before, the United States also set a policy to participate to African development process through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) under Bill Clinton's administration. However, a debate is still going on about whether African Development is possible or not. I will identify the literature on the topic to see what has been said and what has been left aside.

This literature review will focus on the debate over the question of African development to analyze what others had said and how useful those says are to help build my analysis of the NEPAD and identification of a probable link between the NEPAD and the AGOA. After looking at the debate over this question, a review of other analyses on the strength and weakness of the NEPAD will be undertaken in order to find out how trustful is the program in the eyes of scholars and other policymakers. The review of the NEPAD will be followed by another on the AGOA's purposes and intentions. Because they are the main concerns of these discussions, African countries will be the object of my last section to see where they really stand in the global arena when every developmental strategist points at them as the weakest piece in the global economy.

³ It becomes African Union in July 2002.

Finally, a conclusion will synthesize all these vantage points and open a door for a critical analysis of the question and African countries' role.

THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT DEBATE

If all readings about the African development disagree on the responsibility and the approaches to make it work, they still have a point of agreement: what the world has been expecting from Africa is not there yet. Despite amounts of money, policies, politics, strategies, programs and other related actions, Africa is not making the expected progress from it. This led Mbaya Kankwenda to call African development a big business in the world whose suppliers are developed countries and international institutions while Africa is the buyer.⁴ If most of African authors agree that the failure of development strategies in Africa is due to the lack of ownership by African leaders,⁵ other think it is the result of a bad heritage of colonialism and wrong intervention of the United States.⁶ Though it is well said to situate responsibilities and failures, the definition of development that each author analyzed is broaden.

Development is a transversal approach and interdisciplinary concept. The United Nations (UN) to define its development index uses many variables such as literacy, life

⁴ Kankwenda, M. 2004. Forty Years of Development Illusions: Revisiting Development Policies and Practices in Africa. *Onimode, Bade et al. African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century: Looking Back to Move Forward: Essays in honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. London: Zed Books.

⁵ Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004.

Maathai, Wangari. *The Challenge for Africa*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2009.

Ake, Claude. *A Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Longman Inc., 1981.

⁶ Commins, Stephen K., Bank World, Los Angeles African Studies Center University of California, and Los Angeles African Studies Center Development Institute University of California. "Africa's Development Challenges and the World Bank : Hard Questions, Costly Choices." Boulder, Colo., 1988 1988.

Amin, Samir. *Afrique: Exclusion Programmée Ou Renaissance*. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005.

expectancy, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, and access to public services. Development is a state of progress from a bad situation to a better one. It is an amelioration of a specific event/situation measured during a certain period. However, speaking broadly of African development lacks focus and needs be restated. In term of political development, Africa is struggling with the concept of democracy since the end of the Cold War. Used to dictatorship and the single party phenomenon, Africans face nowadays the rise of multiparty system whose leaders mostly are the defects from the first leaders of single party that ruled the countries before the advent of democracy in 1990s. The social development is focused on some living standards such as those used by the UN. In addition, finally, the one in which I am interested is economic development. Economic development is mainly measured by the economic growth used as a standard instrument to analyze a country's development. What really lacks to permit a good analysis of progress in a country is the redistribution of this wealth within the population. Though, some countries have a good, even the best, GDP per capita among African countries, some evidence shows a huge gap between the wealthier (often the elites) and the poorest (usually in the urban areas) .⁷ Where this shrill difference in society can be found is in countries that are under extractive economies .⁸ Despite this lack of common vision of development in the literature, most critics are oriented towards colonization, the structural adjustment programs, which are recurrent in their implementation in Africa, the conflict over the continent during the Cold War between capitalism and communism

⁷ Rutten, M. M. E. M., Andre Leliveld, and D. Foeken. *Inside Poverty and Development in Africa : Critical Reflections on Pro-Poor Policies*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008.

⁸ Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

(namely the United States and the Soviet Union) and finally the lack of internal visions for Africa's development by its leaders

For Taylor,⁹ the heritage of colonialism in Africa is a set of clientelism, neopatrimonialism in the administration of the public services and these have survived to democratization. According to Taylor, African countries have inherited dysfunctional state that is "weak and ineffective"¹⁰ in their bureaucracies, making it hard to establish a sustainable development. M. M. E. M Rutten, André Leliveld and D. Foeken¹¹ argue that the main purpose of colonial support is not towards the improvement of living conditions but rather for the colonial powers self interest by taxing local population. Later on, the colonial powers changed the aim, though it is still by self-interest, to sustainable development. According to Wangari Maathai,¹² blaming the colonialism is a pretext for Africans to escape their responsibilities in the failure of their development. In effect, she thinks the postcolonial administration is to blame because it betrayed the trust African peoples put in their first leaders. For her, African countries lack the inner leadership that would or can work for the wealth of their Nations and that "[t]he challenge continues for each generation of Africans."¹³ Crawford Young, in *Africa's Colonial Legacies*,¹⁴ shares this point of view and sees this "impasse in the development process evident today"¹⁵ as a result of a lack of a true state defined by realists and liberals. Thus, colonialism is to

⁹ Op cit.

¹⁰ Ibidem: 3.

¹¹ Op cit.

¹² Op cit.

¹³ Ibidem: 47.

¹⁴ Berg, Robert J., Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Strategies Committee on African Development, Relations Council on Foreign, and Council Overseas Development. *Strategies for African Development : A Study for the Committee on African Development Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986: 25-51.

¹⁵ Ibidem: 25.

blame by most developmental theorists because of this legacy. This blame finally became a western demonization. It was all about Western countries wanting to exploit African resources and enrich themselves rather than to help Africans. This trend of beliefs is reinforced by the end of the Cold War between the United States, its allies and the Soviet Union.

Taylor clearly laid out this disengagement of the West in sustaining efforts in Africa towards development after the end of the Cold War. Speaking about the NEPAD, he argues that “the West has seemingly disengaged from the continent [Africa] now that the bipolar world has ended,”¹⁶ meaning the West was sustaining Africa because of opposition to the Soviet bloc in order to avoid African countries flirting with communism and making it stronger. Berg and Whitaker¹⁷ confirm it arguing that the fear of threat from outside led Western countries and the Soviet Union to compete in Africa by recruiting agents sometimes within state’s agents. They further add, “the former metropole sought to preserve bastions of influence within the post-colonial state and to exclude the new intruders.”¹⁸ In order to maintain the hold on those state leaders and reach their goals, they were ready to support any policy from the leaders and/or suggest any policy that allows them to have control over the new states. For this purpose, no later after the end of the colonial period, with the independence movements, some leaders that were not in their favor have been coldly eliminated. Patrice Lumumba in the ancient Belgian Congo (actual Democratic Republic of Congo - DRC or formally Zaire) is an

¹⁶ Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005: 10.

¹⁷ Berg, Robert J., Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Strategies Committee on African Development, Relations Council on Foreign, and Council Overseas Development. *Strategies for African Development : A Study for the Committee on African Development Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

¹⁸ Ibidem: 35.

evident example. Others have seen a rise of a rebellious opposition like Jonas Savimbi in Angola or a violent overthrow like the one that happened to Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana.¹⁹ For example, United States aid to Africa was motivated during that time by the threat the Soviet Union represented to its national security if this latter made friends among African governments. Thus, support to development during this period was just driven by both national interests and national values from the United States.²⁰ Such interventions, rather than establishing stability, created insurrection and troubles for long periods in some countries: examples are still there in DRC and in Angola except in Ghana. All those western efforts and policies are backed up by international institutions, mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Those institutions called commonly Bretton Woods institutions settled themselves through the SAP.

Except economists from the World Bank, not all of them however, critics think and sustain that the SAP, rather than helping the continent to develop, just harmed it more than the success depicted by the World Bank. Called “gurus” and “marabouts” of development by Kankwenda, the experts from those institutions landed in Africa with policies and strategies for development shaped by the western traditions of development and failed to consider the African realms.²¹ In effect, initiated in response to the Mexican financial crisis, these programs have simply been transferred in Africa in 1981 after the

¹⁹ Sachs, Jeffrey. *The End of Poverty : Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.

²⁰ Joseph, Richard A., and Alexandra Gillies. *Smart Aid for African Development*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009.

²¹ Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004.

Professor Elliot Berg report for the World Bank .²² This, according to Taylor, is a response to Lagos Plan of Action (LAP) that emphasized the fact that the state should be the main actor of growth. Africa is supposed to have similar characteristics to Mexico according to many reports from the World Bank. Africa is always compared to Latin America in these institutions reports and policies. The main goals of the SAP are “stabilization policies and policy reform efforts.”²³ Aiming at the long run, this program is seen by most economists and Africans as another form of imperialism over Africa and is just a set of strategies to more impoverish the continent. If for those opponents to the SAP, the underdevelopment or the African development puzzle is due to inadequate policies mainly the SAP, it is not for the proponents and the World Bank. Hence, Charles Elliot in his contribution states that

Africa’s problems arose from a combination of two basic factors: internal mismanagement in general and of prices in particular (most notably agricultural prices and the prices of foreign exchange); and a series of external shocks, some of them human-made (such as the oil price revolution) and some natural (such as the climate shift that produced the series of droughts in the early years of this decade [1980s]).”²⁴

Thus, to illustrate that, it is not the policy that failed but the inefficiency in most African systems and he points at a narrow system of taxes that cannot support the governmental expenditures. The main World Bank criticism towards African countries is that their leaders do not own the SAP and because of nepotism, clientelism and

²² Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

²³ Picard, Louis A., Michele Garrity, and The International Institute of Administrative Sciences. *Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Africa : The Institutional Imperative*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994: 2.

²⁴ Commins, Stephen K., Bank World, Los Angeles African Studies Center University of California, and Los Angeles African Studies Center Development Institute University of California. "Africa's Development Challenges and the World Bank : Hard Questions, Costly Choices." Boulder, Colo., 1988: 215.

corruption the policy stalls and cannot reach its objectives. Along this debate is also the question of aid.

According to Anya Schiffrin,²⁵ for William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo, it is aid that is taking Africa back. Sachs thinks that much needs to be done in Africa with less but the Western countries do not see it but only give what is just for survival. For instance, he emphasizes on reducing diseases and other causes of less productivity that led to poverty in Africa. However, recently, Moyo supports World Bank economists asserting that aid does not work but rather kills development in Africa and that economic liberalism is the principle that can push Africans to increase their production and participate to the global economy efficiently.²⁶ However, aid or loans are subjects to the previous strategies that are criticized and vilipended by the opponents and praised by proponents.

What do we learn through this debate over approaches, strategies, policies and programs to develop the continent? The authors here nicely handle it by assessing their concerns on the issue. Speaking about African development encompasses all aspect of development according to these authors. Whether the readings accuse Western countries directly or through the colonialism or programs run by the World Bank and the IMF, or the African governments to be unable to cooperate accurately and implement the programs on their own, they are all right. If needs are to enhance African development, none of these factors can be let aside: politics, governance, economy, social life and so on. All of these development aspects are related. The questions that have been letting aside are: what is really needed in Africa? Followed by what is the cause of a corrupted

²⁵ Schiffrin, Anya. "Moyo Joins the Frey." *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* X, no. Number 1 (Winter/Spring) (2009).

²⁶ Moyo, Dambisa. *Dead Aid : Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

government or a civil servant? What causes poverty? And finally the real question, if answers are found to those questions, is how can Africa reach the first required factor in order to lift up and catch the train of development? In my opinion, this is set when the NEPAD was created by African heads of states in a common concourse in order to tackle the problem from inside. But, what is the NEPAD? How strong is it as a program? What has it different to all the previous programs? Is it the only initiative that African leaders have innovated? Those questions will find their answer in the following section.

NEPAD'S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Before I lay down what makes the NEPAD stronger or weaker compared to other previous attempts to help Africa recover from the underdevelopment illness, it is important to know what NEPAD is and what its ultimate aim is. After a full knowledge²⁷ of the program, I will analyze what is supposed to be its strengths and weaknesses in this section.

According to Agubuzu and Adedeji,²⁸ the NEPAD is a product of urgent need of Africa to get rid of its pandemic state of poverty felt by two of African heads of states; which is not true. In effect, this was a mandate given by other heads of states at the 1999 summit in Algiers to five leading countries (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa) to “work out a development program to spread Africa’s renewal”²⁹ rather than personal initiatives as they think; though they later try to catch up by saying special tasks towards outside partners have been given to Algeria, South Africa and Nigeria by the

²⁷ Though some authors think that NEPAD is struggling because not all the proponents fully understand it.

²⁸ Op cit.

²⁹ Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005: 1.

other African heads of states.³⁰ However, those tasks have not been executed separately. From the English Speaking leaders, led by Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), came the Millennium African Renaissance Partnership (MAP) and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal) alone proposed the Omega Plan from the French speakers' side. At the 37th submit of the former Organization of African Unity in Zambia in July 2001, the heads of states merged those two strategies to create the New Partnership of Africa's Development – NEPAD. This initiative upon which African leaders have embarked the continent is a tool to transform its prospects for economic progress and differs from others through its special features.³¹ The ultimate goal of the program is to promote “democracy, stability, good governance, human rights, and economic development on the continent;”³² mainly reducing the risk of conflicts and instability in the continent. For its success, NEPAD makes a distinction between political and economic governances. In fewer words, NEPAD is a program initiated by African leaders to overcome their difficulty to follow the race of development in which the whole world is engaged, to catch up with their lateness and finally be responsible for their own development. Born under the auspices of the OAU and later transferred to the African Union's, NEPAD is a response to critics that African leaders had been following outsiders' strategies and policies and fail to own these strategies and foster their development.

³⁰ Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004: 238.

³¹ Jabbra, Joseph G., and O. P. Dwivedi. *Administrative Culture in a Global Context*. Whitby, Ont.: de Sitter Publications, 2005.

Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

Joseph, Richard A., and Alexandra Gillies. *Smart Aid for African Development*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009.

³² Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005: 9.

Then, what makes NEPAD different and stronger than previous program or strategies? In effect, as Taylor points out, NEPAD is not the first and only attempt to tackle African development question. It does not come out from nothing but has several predecessors³³ initiated from 1980 to 2001 with merely one strategy/program every year.³⁴ First of all was the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) that was to promote the role of the state in the process of development. The last was the MAP from Mbeki associated with Olesgun Obasanjo and Bouteflika preceded by the Omega Plan from Abdoulaye Wade. Mostly those ‘ancestors’ of NEPAD aimed to human rights, economic and social development, peace, stability, security, cooperation, democracy and good governance. What really makes NEPAD particular is that, for the first time, it has been an act of African leaders, principally the heads of states, for Africans. It makes Africans feel, for once, they have to be the main actors of their development through inner and external integration. Inner integration aims to help African countries cooperate while external integration looks at the international community in order to gain recognition as a capable partner and integrate the global economy (For more read Ian Taylor, 2005). As Bamidele Oluwu and Ejeviome Eloho Ootobo³⁵ lay out, “NEPAD differs from previous development initiatives in giving explicit recognition to government as an important factor in economic development” (P. 193) with special mechanism tools like the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) that has to be a controlling element of the program. Because of the wide range of perspectives NEPAD carries, it is orientated towards what

³³ He listed 16 of them including the NEPAD.

³⁴ Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005: 15-18.

³⁵ Jabbara, Joseph G., and O. P. Dwivedi. *Administrative Culture in a Global Context*. Whitby, Ont.: de Sitter Publications, 2005: 189.

is called sectoral priorities such as infrastructures; human resources development; agriculture; the environment; culture; science and technology; capital flows and market access. The strategy to implement the program aims at capacity building thorough the continent in order to reach the objectives. Another strength to underline is the support that NEPAD received when it first came up. In effect, initiated by pro-West African leaders, it had received a full support from the G8 from which it incorporates the Africa Action Plan .³⁶ This support is also due to the fact that the goal of market access makes a call to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Western countries expecting to have good deals through their Multinational Firms. Despite this pride of African leaders to achieve African elites' dreams by establishing this so praised program (sometimes called strategy or vision), this inventiveness does not lack imperfections.

In effect, first, what put NEPAD on the scope of skepticism is the quality of the promoters: African heads of states. How trustworthy are leaders that mostly have been holding their peoples in hostage? Taylor shows that “at the beginning of twenty-first century, 39 percent of Africa’s rulers have been in power for over ten years, and 28 percent have been presidents for fifteen years or more [while the] resilient 19 percent have sat on the throne of power for twenty years or more and two have been heads of state for over thirty years – one of whom sits on NEPAD’s Heads of State Implementation Committee.”³⁷ He goes further arguing that this neopatrimonialism will sabotage the implementation of the program because it is “an elite-driven, top down

³⁶ Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004: 252.

³⁷ Op cit.: 4.

project that has negligible input on ordinary Africans”³⁸ because of the highly dubious quality of its promoters and adherents. This leaders’ elite is a reminiscence of the postcolonial era and had well served the prior rulers with single parties or dictatorship but cannot do so to them in this 21st century. To close this debate about leaders solidarity, Taylor says “Africa should move beyond it,”³⁹ meaning, to implement a real democracy and a real good governance in a global understanding of the terms but not the one conceived by this syndicate of African leaders. Another incapacity that Taylor points at is the lack of common language towards the West while African leaders deal with developed countries. They request equal treatment though they have specific and different ruling manners that the West hardly accepts. He also thinks the NEPAD was written accordingly to what western countries want to hear in order to sustain African leaders’ initiatives. Mostly, for Taylor, the NEPAD fails to look at the inconformity of the notion of state, in Weberian terms. For him, African states are not real states in the Weberian definition of state and call the NEPAD another false start. Taylor is not the only one seeing failures in the conception of the NEPAD and the challenges that it can face. Onimode notes that “[a] dictator or an autocrat yesterday cannot ‘miraculously’ become a democrat today”⁴⁰ when looking at the context of the implementation of NEPAD. For Onimode, democracy is an important basic element of the NEPAD’s implementation; unfortunately, it has not been internalized by African leaders and all social sectors. This illustrates the complex separation of two governances though one

³⁸ Ibidem: 170.

³⁹ Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005: 170.

⁴⁰ Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004: 244.

initiative of governance based upon both politics and economy is needed. Inquiring for the resources needed for the NEPAD, he criticizes the pessimistic vision of aid in Africa and the optimistic one toward FDI and that it is merely a copy of the “Washington consensus whose credibility has been severely undermined by the persistent economic instability in Latin America, the debacle in Russia[...] and the Asian Flu.”⁴¹ Thus, Onimode does not believe in the originality of the NEPAD but thinks it is an initiative of African leaders to show the West that they care and gain acknowledgement of innovation. If looking on the perspective of development, the strategy leads Onimode and Taylor to see the NEPAD as another program full of mistakes and lack of a broad vision, Olowu and Ootobo⁴² have the same reaction when questioning the NEPAD’s administrative organization. Those co-authors lay out three weak points that the United Nations figure out. The low capacity of African countries to implement the program, translation of the program priorities into real actions at all levels, and the resources mobilization are the key major challenges that its implementation can face. Because these three challenges are closely related to public services upon which depends the implementation of the NEPAD, they can pose obstacles to reach the ultimate goal of Africans.

This discussion shows how, though it is praised by proponents and even opponents, NEPAD is not expected to solve African development question. What deserves to be noticed here is that all the critics are still looking at the same side as they did and still do for previous program: politics and economy. They look at it and lay out

⁴¹ Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004: 246-52.

⁴² Jabbara, Joseph G., and O. P. Dwivedi. *Administrative Culture in a Global Context*. Whitby, Ont.: de Sitter Publications, 2005.

the same factors that backed the preceding programs that are incriminated to be whether western ideas or under western dictation. Because they did not include Africans or lack Africans' appropriation, Hassan A. Sunmonu uses an African proverb saying "you cannot shave somebody's head in his/her absence."⁴³ What is missed here is a regional leadership. A real leader that can constrain, even coerce if possible, other leaders in Africa to compel them to meet the NEPAD's goal and objectives. They also do not see the weight of African Diasporas. These Africans living out of their continent for many reasons claim to be within the main constituents to implement the program. What is better than Africans investing in their region (countries or villages)? However, not only the program fails to take this element in consideration but also the realm does not encourage them to invest where they are originated. Without security and fair politics, investors fear that their enterprises or stakeholds will disappear one day when a seemingly democratic leader will decide one waking morning to nationalize private firms. This is a real brake to FDI that is so necessary to increase economic growth, a leading element to development. They also fail to look at associations and other peasants' organizations doing amazing jobs but remain silent because of the lack of communications infrastructures. Another factor that escaped this race to development of Africa against itself is the lack of vision of partners' programs. Although the G8 had replied to the program with the G8 Africa Action Plan, the NEPAD does not make room to any other outside plan to be integrated to its action during its implementation. Reading through the NEPAD documents, it seems African leaders want to implement it first and

⁴³ Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004: 63.

later look outside what can be integrated or not; still demonizing the West for merely fifty years of failed programs to enhance the continent development. Beside Cotonou agreements and the Africa Action Plan exists the African Growth and Opportunity Act – AGOA – that preceded all the process bringing up NEPAD; but it has not been considered in any document though it is not an aid program that Africans leaders revile too much. The following section will try to look at the AGOA and seek to understand the reasons that support its initiation and what is said to compile it with any African initiative set earlier or an innovative one later.

AGOA'S PURPOSE AND INTENTION

Over decades the U.S had not merely intervened in African affairs or only through the international institutions in which it participates. The principals are the World Bank and the IMF. It sometimes does so through others such as the World Trade Organization or the World Health Organization in trade and health in global matters but not specifically. It can be argued that the U.S had nothing to gain in Africa or that it had no interests at that time. This can be understood in the light that the U.S sees itself as a non-imperialist power. Africa is a reservoir of France and the United Kingdom . Those two countries had colonized most countries where they excerpted much raw matters for their industries, and exploited people through slavery. The advent of independence had changed their control over the countries. Rather than being the main actors, the colonial powers put in place local emerging leaders that ruled the countries on their behalf. Thus, if the U.S had tried to intervene or implement any personal strategy it would raise a controversial opposition though the U.S is a close ally to France and the United Kingdom

because of the two major wars happened during 1914 – 1918 and 1939 – 1945. So, why does it initiate a strategy to solve the African development question?

A brief answer is given by Sachs⁴⁴ arguing that because he talked to the U.S Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin about the opportunity that Africa can profit from free zones of trade offered by the U.S and that it fitted the department draft of such a policy, it was translated in AGOA. Beside his conviction, Sachs does not tell us what are the objectives and goals of this department's policy draft. One needs not say that the full policy is not my concern here. Unlike the NEPAD program being cited in every paper/book speaking about Africa development, this program raises few reactions. Few scholar articles and newspapers talk about AGOA arguing it is a shift from aid to trade.

A recent one is from James S. Guseh and Emmanuel O. Oritsejafor⁴⁵ and explores the impact of the program on Sub-Saharan Africa. According to these authors, the main goal of AGOA is to eliminate the recurrent state of poverty in Africa through trade and investment. Initiated in June 1997 by the Clinton administration in terms of Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa and turned into a U.S law on May 18, 2000, the AGOA is a U.S partnership instrument with Africa. Through this partnership, the U.S engages itself to eliminate tariffs for a list of products imported from the continent in order to enhance private entrepreneurship. Guseh and Oritsejafor lay down the list of the AGOA's objectives as following:

1. Strengthen and expand the private sector in sub-Saharan Africa, especially women-owned business;
2. Encourage increased trade and investment between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa;

⁴⁴ Op cit.: 195.

⁴⁵ Op cit.

3. Reduce tariff and non tariff barriers, as well as other obstacles to trade;
4. Expand United States assistance to sub-Saharan Africa's regional integration efforts;
5. Establish a United States and sub-Saharan Africa Trade Investment Partnership;
6. Focus on countries committed to accountable government, economic reform, and the eradication of poverty;
7. Establish a United States-sub Saharan Economic Cooperation Forum; and
8. Support development assistance for those countries in sub-Saharan Africa attempting to build civil societies (P. 126).

Further, Guseh and Oritsejafor add that AGOA is an amendment to the Generalized System of Preferences that has been running since 1974 and is designed to "promote economic growth in the developing countries by providing preferential, duty free entry for more than 4,650 products from 144 designated countries and territories" (P. 126). Because Africa is behind most of the developing countries in matter of development, Clinton administration thought it needed have same opportunities or more favors compared to others in order to succeed. Thus, AGOA was created. However, aiming at extractive, clothing and other related economies, this policy has attracted other scholars' attention and critics.

In *African Growth and Opportunity Act, Real Partnership or "Old Wine in New Bottles?"* Julius Nyang'oro assigns this shift of policy toward Africa to the end of the Cold War rather than a will to aid a "friend" continent to overcome its difficulties.⁴⁶ He sustains his argument with the fact that because of the fuzzy role played by the U.S during the Cold War in Africa by supporting dictators without real results in terms of development and social changes, the United States needs to catch up. In another way, the

⁴⁶ Nyang'Oro, J. "Africa Growth Opportunity Act: Real Partnership Or "Old Wine in New Bottles"?" *Cooperation South* 2 (2000).

Congress argues on the low level of exchange between the United States and Africa and that AGOA is to increase this issue. Nyang'oro again recalls his argument concerning the one from the U.S advancing the idea that AGOA is to include Africa in the global economy saying "Africa is already a part of global economy" but his problem is its dependency economy that mostly relies on western countries' economies. Though the goal of this paper is not to present the program but what is said about it, any reader who is interested in can have more information on the following website www.agoa.gov. In effect, even though praised by the U.S and other supporters, AGOA has been looked through some lenses that need be said. These are whether articles in newspapers or scholars such as the previous that scrutinize the policy. They have closely looked at the list of products and think the continent lacks the capacity and skills required to take advantage of the program; and, that this program does not help the continent but rather helps U.S farmers.⁴⁷ Hanson still adds that because of the restrictions on access and eligibility criteria, many countries in Africa do not really benefit from the program. Other grievances against AGOA are the non precise level of funding that is available to build the capacity through the trade assistance policy, the limited level of connections between American small businesses – though few are even aware of the existence of AGOA – and the lack of liberalization among African countries.

Whatever is said until now and needs be said is that the policy is a shift to enhance African development and build its trade capacity. Whether it is to fix mistakes during the Cold War or to improve the level of trade between the continent and the United States, the initiative is there and needs be considered and integrated in African

⁴⁷ Hanson, Stephanie. "The African Growth Act." *Council on Foreign Relations* (2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/17815/african_growth_and_opportunity_act.html.

leaders' policies. However, the confusing element here is that the AGOA is a combination of aid and trade. What is not clear in the AGOA documents is which one comes first? Is it building capacity to implement the project or implementation in countries that need less aid for it or that have the infrastructures needed to develop trade and, thus, develop the countries? Apparently, the United States is doing both. Another remark towards the program is also that the latitude given to the President of the United States to decide which country is eligible and the periodic changes in it are not useful. It can lead some countries that have already adapted their economies to the program to fall on disillusion and drop back in another cycle of fight for development. Considering critics and analyses of the program, what is essential to African development is not only what is done to develop it but where does it stand in the international community? From their independence to nowadays, what role have they been playing? Those questions are the objects of my inquiries in the next section.

AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE GLOBAL ARENA

African development is not an easier question to tackle. In effect, Africa is a continent with more than fifty countries spreading from South to North, full of diversities and differences. Thus, each of them is shaped by its social constituents such as culture, customs and beliefs. However, there is a particular attention that needs be paid to the question. As a continent in whole, whatever country is taken in consideration, it affects the others' evolution through development. Here is not a place to make African history; however, a little look back is necessary.

No wonder if Africa had been colonized and exploited for western research of wealth, that colonization and slavery had badly harmed it. If today western scholars think

African states are not states in Weberian terms,⁴⁸ the mistake does not lay upon Africans but rather on Europe after the conference of Berlin that divided the continent among losers and winners of the World War I and their allies.⁴⁹ Independence and its successions of battles that the continent faces are however not western countries' fault and need be analyzed in the way it gives clarity and lift to better help it move forth. As Axelle Kabou points out, Africa refuses to develop because of peoples' mentalities and behaviors that need be taken in consideration.⁵⁰ From politicians to individuals in many countries, the trend is to blame colonization and make the colonial formal powers "pay" for what they have done to the continent. Then the intellectual elite found its way in the marginalization of Africa in the global arena. Kabou argues that

[a]ussi, la notion de marginalisation du continent africain n'est-elle entrée que très récemment dans les consciences claquemurées depuis trente ans derrière leur droit mythique à la différence... par le truchement de la raréfaction subite de l'argent et du travail salarié (P. 203).⁵¹

Thus, the notion of marginalization is a fabrication of disappointed Africans that cannot find an answer to the obvious question of why do they find themselves in such a situation. However, this difficulty to speak about African development can be easily explained.

Despite African leaders will to integrate the continent in a whole to foster its development, ties of colonial powers remain in one way or another, readings of reports from international institutions or organizations still show that Africa is defined by

⁴⁸ Taylor, Ian. "Nepad Ignores the Fundamental Politics of Africa." *Contemporary Review*, no. 1662 (2004): 29-32.

⁴⁹ Unesco, and The Ichs International Committee of Historical Sciences. *Des Frontières En Afrique Du Xiie Au Xxe Siecle : Bamako, 1999*. Paris: Unesco, 2005.

⁵⁰ *Op cit.*

⁵¹ Thus, the notion of African continent marginalization recently came up in their closed minds for thirty years behind their mythic right to difference... through the sudden rarefaction of money and paid job.

western countries. In their reports they still separate the North of Africa from what is called the Sub-Saharan Africa and exclude the Maghreb. Transparency International, the World Economic Forum and even some reports of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund align most of the Northern African countries to Europe or the Middle East. Seemingly, a country in the continent that is doing well is not a part of Africa or in which people look Caucasian is not either? This is a question at which African leaders need look at closely. However, can we say Africa is marginalized? If so, what is marginalization?

First of all, a definition of marginalization is needed before going far in the discussion. To marginalize is defined as “to make someone less important or something less valuable”⁵² or “to make a person or group of people unimportant and powerless in an unfair way.”⁵³ Then, we can understand that when saying Africa is marginalized means Africa is powerless or is unimportant or otherwise less important to the international community. But, evidence shows the contrary. Yet, through history we know that it is true Africa is not marginalized. Why the West is helping the continent if it is not important to it?

Colonization is a period of spread of imperialism: the more lands a country colonized, the more powerful it was. Though the missions at that time were supposed to “civilized”, it finally rose as imperialism or colonization used interchangeably. Ake defines it as:

⁵² Rideout, Philip M., and House Newbury. "Heinle's Newbury House Dictionary of American English." Boston, MA: Thomson/Heinle, 2004.

⁵³ Summers, Della. "Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English." Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education, 2005.

the economic control and exploitation of foreign lands arising from necessity for counteracting the impediments to accumulation of capital engendered by internal contradictions of the domestic capitalist economy (P. 20).⁵⁴

showing that it was a result of struggles to make stable a capitalistic economy in Europe. The necessity of decolonization came from African elites that embraced European civilization and claimed the sovereignty of their lands. Unfortunately, even when granted, it was after arbitrary division of the continent in pieces called countries. Most of the leaders were chosen and put in power by the former colonial countries. Some exception remains, however, such as Ethiopia which was not colonized. Exception on resistance also exists and Sekou Touré (Conakry Guinea) was an example. However, resisters have had a bad end; either they died in exile or had been killed with the complicity of the West in order to put trustworthy persons in their places and exploit the natural resources (for more read Claude Ake: *A Political Economy of Africa*). Thus, one needs not show Africa has been considered as a valuable actor in the international arena.

In effect, soon after their participation to the WWII, Africans were rewarded with decorations and other signs to demonstrate the West's friendship to Africa. Moreover, the role played by African divisions at France's side and the prejudice it suffered were reasons to consider it and make it reach the western level. Because the Marshall Plan could not fit in the African realm, developed countries, international institutions and organizations involved in programs, projects and other ways to sustain the new leaders in power to improve their participation in the economic arena always seek for better strategies. Unfortunately, contradictions, distortions and other disturbing factors inherent

⁵⁴ Op cit.

to Africa make all those efforts to move back or stall.⁵⁵ For Nicolas van de Walle, most of those reforms did not work because they were manipulated to promote leaders' interests rather than the populations because of the Cold War between the two major poles at that time,⁵⁶ mainly the United States and the Soviet Union. Either it is through a global lens or an individual one to scrutinize the African problem that scholars or policymakers have to deal with the same factors: lack of security, bad governance, lack of real democracy and finally a decline in or low economic growth.

In the light of this general discussion, we can see that Africa is not marginalized but because of the stereotypes that it is subject to policies which have been initiated to help it but have failed.⁵⁷ From the colonial period to now, African countries occupy a central place in policies because the international community is concerned with people living there as human beings that the welfare needs improvement. Unfortunately, because of the traditional economies and delinquent behaviors of its leaders that care more about themselves rather than their countries, the policies never reached their goals. To rely on Kabou's understanding of the phenomenon, it is probably the unwillingness of Africans, not all off course but maybe most of them, which is a real obstacle to development. Another factor to consider in Africa that could explain this diversity is the high number of adversaries between religions namely Christianity and Islam; the languages barriers

⁵⁵ Ward, Haskell G. *African Development Reconsidered : New Perspectives from the Continent*. New York: Phelps-Stokes Institute, 1989.

⁵⁶ Walle, Nicola Van de. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979 - 1999*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

⁵⁷ Picard, Louis A., Michele Garrity, and The International Institute of Administrative Sciences. *Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Africa : The Institutional Imperative*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994.

especially Arabic, French and English; and not the least, during the Cold War, is the divide between communists and capitalists worlds.

Not officially taken into account, those factors shape also African leaders' behaviors. In effect as Samuel M. Makinda and Wafula Okumu write, before the creation of the Organization of African Unity, Africa was divided into three political groups: Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia (P. 21).⁵⁸ The North mainly Muslim is seen by the sub-Saharan mostly laic and Christian with European eyes while this same North see in the sub-Saharan the Christian world that is the old enemy to Islam. The North is wholly Arabic speaking and French speaking but relies mostly on Arab countries in Asia while the sub-Saharan is a share between France and Great Britain and few speak Portuguese or Spanish. According to the national language spoken in a country, "friendship" with the East or the West shapes their relationship. Thus, African leaders lack real cooperation among themselves, which complicates their future cooperation. One can disagree with this assertion but must know that it is human relationships first and this type of factors need be emphasized. For the West speaks in a general terms of Africa though there are many countries, African leaders need to foster their unity in order to speak in one voice. While others think Africa is marginalized, Africans feel insecure about the globalization that they view as a new form of imperialism.⁵⁹ To overcome this divide, what is needed is a leader that can drive other to espouse his vision for the kind of policies and strategies that Africa needs to develop. Makinda and Okumu call it a *strategic leadership*. They emphasize the fact that:

⁵⁸ M. Makinda, Samuel, and F. Wafula Okumu. *The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance*. New York: Routledge, 2008.

⁵⁹ Ibidem.

Such a leadership is vital for the attainment of sustainable development, the promotion of science and technology, the consolidation of peace and security, and the containment of corruption. This leadership has to be undergirded by at least three ethical principles which are listed in the AU⁶⁰ Constitutive Act: human welfare, security, and socio-economic justice (P. 71).

However, a leadership quality is not granted to someone. It has to be recognized by others and praised in order to be trusted. Unfortunately, African countries are shaped by their history, religious apparatus, and language spheres and also sustained by outside powers upon which they depend since the imperialism period that impeaches their mutual integration. Without trust in each other, African leaders, even though they recognize a potential leader among them, will not be willing to grant him this quality and scepter to lead the continent. Makinda and Okumu clearly show it in their introducing chapter giving the example of what happened to Kwame Nkrumah and the struggles among states. Rather than being unified under the Organization of African Unity, it becomes blocks of opposition within the new born institution (Pp. 11-12).

CONCLUSION

The previous discussions lay out the difficulties to face while speaking about African development. The African continent is a mixing of peoples and characteristics that is also shaped by its history. For many years, it has been a theater of fights among powerful entities – states and institutions – for many reasons: lands, humans and natural resources. Later on, attempts had been done to help the continent stand back on its feet. Unfortunately, most of them failed to reach the expected results.

From individual donors to institutional loans, millions of dollars have been invested in the continent. This was through many channels: aid, loans and trade. Mostly

⁶⁰ African Union.

after their independence was the period of Cold War and western countries also called capitalists countries encompassing some major powers in Europe and the United States were investing in order to make friends leaders and avoid the communist invasion. Within the same period, international organizations convinced African leaders to borrow money from them. For those institutions represent the face of the western “friends” and opportunity for those leaders to enrich themselves, they did not hesitate to be involved in the Structural Adjustment Program with Senegal as the first beneficiary in 1979.⁶¹ Since then, others suit it and half of the continent has been undergoing from renewal to renewal in terms of the Enhanced Structured Adjustment Facility.

While this program is seen as a success by economists from the World Bank, if speaking about failure, they accuse the continent for the bad governance from Africans. This form of financing the development led to continuous debt due to non-payments and insolvency of most countries in the continent that claim cancelation or discount of their debts.⁶² Other opponents again see it as another form of pillage created by the West to spoil Africa’s richness and natural resources. Conflicts and other internal disputes backed by major powers that felt their interests threatened also compromised the appropriation by Africans and the implementation of those policies. The question of aid too is raised by this discussion.

The opponents of the SAP criticize it because it impoverishes Africa and that this continent’s need, with all that it is going through, is aid not trade or loans. For them, the amount of aid that the continent receives yearly is not sufficient. Compared to the

⁶¹ Walle, Nicola Van de. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979 - 1999*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

⁶² Amin, Samir. *Afrique: Exclusion Programmée Ou Renaissance*. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005.

opulence that the West shows, what Africa needs as aid is negligible. However, pro SAP or opponents to the aid policy think that aid does not help Africa; it rather puts it in a dependency position and harms its own efforts to get rid of its underdevelopment.⁶³ This flow of money in Africa started to be reduced when the Cold War was over with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In effect, with the unipolarity held by the United States, rivalry over the continent disappeared. Thus, there was no need to invest money that is supposed to prevent African leaders to join the communist pole. However, Africa did not rely only on western strategies to develop.

Because African leaders are also concerned with their implication in their continent's development, they created institutions and strategies to cover their problems. From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD, African leaders are preoccupied by problems that face their continent and factors that slow its development. NEPAD is African leaders' creation in 2001 to overcome four major factors that Africa faces: security, governance, stability and democracy, and market access. Unfortunately, some authors think it is a copy of the Washington consensus or another writing of the SAP, though it is oriented towards economic liberalism and in the way to respect donors requirements but has no incentive to development from its initiators.⁶⁴ This program is under the auspices of the African Union, a replacement of the Organization of African Unity due to the end of the Cold War, and suffers internal struggles on leadership and mistrust though it needs a

⁶³Moyo, Dambisa. *Dead Aid : Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

⁶⁴Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004.

Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

strategic leadership with a broad range of competencies to help it and the NEPAD achieve their goals.⁶⁵ Praised and criticized for its originality, the NEPAD is mostly focused on foreign direct investment. Unfortunately, conditions in the continent are likely to postpone foreign investment or the African diaspora to invest in their home continent. Moreover, NEPAD lacks seriously to take into account the possible contribution of its diaspora.⁶⁶ While African leaders were thinking on the NEPAD, an American policy in favor of Africa was also taking place: the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

With its paternity claimed by Sachs,⁶⁷ this is an American law to favor African countries by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers that face African countries which trade with the United States. Less discussed by scholars, this is viewed as a good instrument that benefits Africa the most. While other authors qualify it as a shift of American policy because of the end of the Cold War, the proponents praise it and make it look like an amendment to the General System of Preferences, another policy towards Less Developed Beneficiary Countries initiated by the U.S in 1974.⁶⁸ Because of its list of products, criteria of eligibility and the discretion of the President of the U.S to decide which countries in Africa are eligible, opponents classify it as another strategy to benefit the U.S more than Africa though most countries in Africa lack the competitiveness that is

⁶⁵ M. Makinda, Samuel, and F. Wafula Okumu. *The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance*. New York: Routledge, 2008.

⁶⁶ Mercer, Claire, Ben Page, and Martin Evans. *Development and the African Diaspora : Place and the Politics of Home*. London; New York: Zed Books, 2008.

All African Students, Conference, B. F. Bankie, and K. J. McHombu. *Pan-Africanism/African Nationalism : Strengthening the Unity of Africa and Its Diaspora*, All African Students Conference. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2005.

⁶⁷ Sachs, Jeffrey. *The End of Poverty : Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.

⁶⁸ Guseh, J., and E. Oritsejafor. "The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 10, no. 1 (2009): 123-42.

necessary to fulfill the criteria.⁶⁹ The aim of this policy, like the European one named Cotonou Agreement, is to integrate Africa into the global economy, which is not a sufficient reason.

In effect, it needs not integrate Africa in a certain global economy though it has been a part of it for decades. From its colonization due to capitalist economy impediments in Europe that harmed the continent in different ways, Africa is a full member of global economy. African countries were divided by the colonial powers and other allies in order to prevent the communist invasion. What makes it miss its participation in the concert of development and foster its own development is the lack of competitiveness. Africa relies on traditional economies based upon raw materials. The state of non-industrialization is what backed Africa to negotiate equally with the West and have a voice in the chapter of its development and impact on global decision. Africa is not marginalized; it is not competitive. Moreover, the divide in different kinds of apparatus in Africa creates a misconception of the role of any leader that will rise to innovate and show the strategies that are useful to it. Examples in the past show that history has shaped leaders and individual behaviors and created mistrust and fear among African leaders. However, Makinda and Okumu⁷⁰ underline the critical role or need of such a leader to create a strong Africa that can speak with its own and one voice.

⁶⁹ Nyang'Oro, J. "Africa Growth Opportunity Act: Real Partnership Or "Old Wine in New Bottles"?" *Cooperation South* 2 (2000).

Hanson, Stephanie. "The African Growth Act." *Council on Foreign Relations* (2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/17815/african_growth_and_opportunity_act.html.

⁷⁰ Op cit.

CHAPTER III

BEHIND OTHER GAME PLAYERS

As I said in previous chapters, Africa blames colonization and marginalization for its underdevelopment. In addition to that, some scholars and observers think Africa lacks the will to develop itself because there are little things it can do but stalls to do for many reasons. I personally think that African leaders are in the playing field which has been flattened by globalization¹ but they refuse to play even though they step in. They wait for other players to hand them the victory.

In this chapter, I will pay attention to what is missing in the NEPAD program and the misconception of the program. To enhance this analysis, a glimpse to some strong theories and approaches of development are necessary. This digression in this chapter is useful to strengthen the assertions and criticisms that I would address. It will help lay down what are similar in the NEPAD and the AGOA. Although the NEPAD claims partnership with other nations, it does not look at what strategies these nations have developed or are setting up to reach the goals devoted to the new so praised program that makes African leaders so proud of themselves but misses a great opportunity to increase the race to development. Before to concluding this chapter, I will pay clear attention to what I call the missing piece in the NEPAD and African policy of development.

DEVELOPMENT THEORIES TO FIT AFRICA BUT NOT THE REVERSE

Looking at the continent since the independence acquired by nations there, those who wanted or still want Africa to develop have exhausted all the theories and

¹ Friedman, Thomas. *The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the 21st Century*. New York: Cambria, 2007.

approaches available in order to achieve their goal. As history shows, some former communist countries still exist. They are having difficulty getting rid of their communist politics despite new leaders in place. The toughest ones to disappear are Ethiopia and Libya illustrating those special types of regimes that do not follow either democracy or authoritarianism. While Libya claims it is a green democracy with one party, Ethiopia puts forth a democratic federalism that oppresses his people.

For African countries that inherited administrative structures from their former colonial powers, they embraced either capitalist approach of development or socialist approach. Countries like Uganda ruled by Idi Amin Dada or Benin at their independence days were more socialist and closer to the Soviet Union because their leaders disapproved what they underwent during colonial period and looked for alternative allies.

While socialist or communist countries alike were trying to adapt the soviet approach built on Marxism theory, countries freed from France and the United Kingdom led by people obedient to the metropolis were using the capitalist approach of development based on capital growth and market economy. Unfortunately, the exchange unveiled to be unequal. The strength of the metropolis' economy compared to those emerging markets was so powerful that it needed raw materials from the colonies whereas these latters sought manufactured items from the developed countries.

However, there is a need to take the analysis from William W. Rostow's point of view arguing the five stages of development.² Where do African countries stand? For Rostow, there are five stages of development: the traditional society, the preconditions

² Rostow, W. W. "The Stages of Economic Growth." *The Economic History Review* 12, no. 1 (1959): 1-16.

for takeoff, the takeoff itself, the maturity stage and the mass consumption. The traditional society is one in which people do not lack inventiveness but lack opportunities to take advantage of their environment. The preconditions call to the phase of industrialization where the onset is ready to help the economy of a society bloom. The takeoff is where the economy is at its regular speed and mostly the state of market economy. A high degree of inventiveness categorizes the last stage of development driven by consumption mostly in the third sector. The first and second sectors, namely agriculture and industrialization, play a lesser role. From this perspective, it looks clear Africa tried to burn all the steps and finds itself at the last stage. However, since infrastructures do not exist to help produce and meet demand, they find themselves dealing with import compensation. This can be explained by the wrong turn those countries took during the independence days.

As matter of fact, independence was thrown at people who dreamt to live like the masters they feared for a long time; believing sometimes they were gods until the two wars proved the idea wrong. As said Seyoum Y. Hameso,³ either it was a dream or a belief; the problem was not the way African leaders thought of independence which is the cause but the misguidance and the misconstruction of the colonial legacy. In fact, a better approach of the missing takeoff is the preconditions. When African elites of the '50s and '60s were asking and fighting for independence, few of them were ready to take over the administration. Thus, they followed the path of the masters and mistreated their so-called new compatriots. The administrative structure put in place by the colonizers were the only adequate ones. The new leaders, mostly faithful people to the former occupants,

³ Hameso, Seyoum Y. *Development, State and Society : Theories and Practice in Contemporary Africa*. San Jose: Authors Choice Press, 2001.

kept and followed the path left there. Thus, the human resources necessary to enhance the process were not present and the change in the traditional administration made things worse. Most of the new leaders were the “traitors” that helped the oppressors establish their power upon lands and people. They were not people of the royal or the traditional authority backyard. Hence, rather than contributing to the race to development, there was revenge and oppression. Some were even worse than the colonizers. This led to armed and ethnic conflicts within the boundaries established at the Berlin conference that divided the continent into states. The leaders lived and behaved like the white men who left the continent. Moreover, since they are at the heads of young nations, they should receive assistance from the former rulers. They found themselves with advisors that were most likely spying on the way they ruled the country and reported to their countries. The metropolis judged any attempt to take another path as dangerous and stopped the initiatives. Thus, African countries likely jumped from the traditional society to the high mass consumption that drove them to import more than export in nominal value. Without preparation to enter the new space of international market, the new rulers took most decision, if not all, under their former colonizers nursing/babysitting. They depended heavily on these “advisors” even with the rise of intellectuals and with the improving capacity they later acquire through training and scholar education. It leads us to the dependency theory so praised by Raul Prebisch.⁴

For Prebisch, the development through industrialization is a development expanding from the center to the periphery. The periphery represents the colonies while center is the developed countries and their high state of modernization. Although, they

⁴ Prebisch, Raúl. "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries." *The American Economic Review* 49, no. 2 (1959): 251-73.

will benefit from the development that expands toward them, periphery-states rely deeply on what is happening in the center. Brian R. Farmer distinguishes the theory in two currents that contend with each other: radical dependency and new dependency.⁵ In radical dependency, there is no need for developing countries to follow the paths of developed ones because of the different history they lived. For new dependency, which contends with the radicals because of the examples of some underdeveloped countries doing better, the center could contribute to periphery's development if the interests of both meet. However, this development benefits only the elites and the high class in the developing countries or only the ruling class takes advantage of it whereas the remaining of the population is far from well-being. The development is not smooth. Farmer states that despite the disagreement, these two currents agree on the fact that

development is outside of the control of LDCs [Less Developed Countries], and underdevelopment is externally caused; unequal exchange is a major mechanism for perpetuating and exacerbating underdevelopment; internationally oriented elites are the only class benefitting from the dependent economy structure within LDCs, what development may occur in dependent economies tend to produce bureaucratic authoritarian governments; the only method for eradicating dependency is socialist revolution (P. 23).

Nothing has changed since the independence days. Less new people in charge and less new people with legitimate authority to undertake the change and the welfare Africans have been expecting since the day they heard about independence that could, for Hameso, bring "hope, and expectations for improving living standards, enhanced independence and freedom" (P. 39).⁶ It was just the beginning of cycle of conflicts, instability and sufferings. The expectations were not met and people rushing for a better

⁵ Farmer, Brian R. *The Question of Dependency and Economic Development : A Quantitative Analysis*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999.

⁶ Op cit.

life, for those who could have alliance and support from outside, revolted or took arms and raised rebellion in most countries. This is because the cultural similarity in Africa where Kabou thinks people are lazy and believe development is a western hobby?⁷

In effect, culture should have something to do with African development since the beginning of the day they were erected as states. It can even go further than that to the colonization epoch. Two cultures cannot meet without collision and shocks. From the shocks they encounter will derive a set of compromises where each one will sort out what is good from the other side and what it cannot take. However, colonization was mostly an imposition of the western culture that Africans had difficulty to withstand. The expression “the thing of white men” is common in Africa even in the Northern part where people display Caucasian like skin color. For most of the metropolis representatives, Africans need be civilized and taught to behave accordingly. They did so through Christianity, schooling and other forms of repression. They brilliantly succeeded when they sent the coming leaders that they prepared to be local indigenous rulers. Though they did not think in terms of independence, they did believe sending people living overseas in Europe would give a taste of change. Back from this new life, those educated people did exactly what could happen. They became the new elite, the new bourgeoisie that no more acted as their relatives. They use more the term “savages” than the colonizers. And as the basis of his cultural theory of development, Robert Inglehart argues traditions do change but not at the speed modernization does.⁸ As African samples to induce Europeanization, the new educated were numerous enough. Moreover,

⁷ Op cit.

⁸ Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy : The Human Development Sequence." Cambridge University Press, <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip052/2004024333.html..>

their attitude towards people they belong to make them pariah. They seemed not belong to their own culture or the western culture/civilization they embraced during their studies. They were hybrids who could hardly stand one or the other of the cultures they were born in and embraced. Those personalities had the responsibility to put Africa on the path of development. For they relied more on their advisors and mentors, they became enemies of their peoples.

Beside those theories of development, once sees programs aiming at increasing growth through aid and financial debt launched by the World Bank and the IMF when the oil price shocks happened in the 1970s. The liberal approach approved by these institutions' economists kept failing either because they did not fit African realities or because of wrong political management of the countries.

Moreover, the most obvious opportunity that becomes a nightmare for many Africans is oil or other natural and mineral resources. Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, Liberia, Gabon, Nigeria and Chad have been exploiting oil that benefits more to their leaders and fuel wars instead of improving the population's wealth. If Chad is new in the oil market, it is the opposite for the others. The exception of Gabon where, even though the president – the would-have-worked with the French secret services who became president after the death of the first president Leon Mba⁹ – grew richer thanks to oil exploitation without destabilization for over forty years, the remaining are used to armed conflicts, ethnic instability and other such troubles. As Nicholas Shaxson¹⁰ points out, the African oil market is filled with corruption, clientelism and other misbehaviors

⁹ Chautard, Sophie. *Les Dictateurs Du Xxe Siècle*, Studyrama Perspectives, 629. Levallois-Perret: Studyrama, 2006.

¹⁰ Shaxson, Nicholas. *Poisoned Wells : The Dirty Politics of African Oil*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

that make it different from a “terrain of normally functioning free markets” (P. 223). In former Zaire – actually the Democratic Republic of Congo – the Kivu and Kolwezi areas have been source of contention and conflicts since independence because of the amount of cobalt, tantalum, copper and diamond they contain. Natural resources and oil in Africa, instead of being sources of development, built the resource curse theory and nurture “dirty politics” to comply with Philippe Le Billon’s argument¹¹ that “[r]esource ownership and revenue sharing are major sources of conflicts, with many claims violently imposed upon or rejected by local communities” (P. 25). Throughout natural resources also, African countries missed the opportunity to develop while other countries disposing the same resources, though the amount and quality vary, take advantage of it.

Blame needs not be on programs, approaches or theories. Scholars and observers criticized and reproached African leaders who sought for means and tools to launch their countries on the right path. They held power longer and were, and still are, the ones plus their relatives to take advantage of the situation. In order to face this criticism the reduction in foreign aid due to the failure of the former Soviet Union, African heads of states decided to innovate and brought forth the idea of a new form of partnership through the NEPAD. Likewise, a year before the act, the United States established a law enabling an increase of trade between African countries and the United States under the AGOA program. A look at the contents of these programs deserves a close and particular attention. In sum, it seems that decision makers at the international institutions and at

¹¹ Le Billon, Philippe, and The International Institute for Strategic Studies. *Fuelling War Natural Resources and Armed Conflict*. Abingdon: Published by Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2005.

affairs in these countries made an effort to fit policy theories to Africa and not apply theories to Africa. In the following section, I will identify if this is workable or not.

MISLEADING BASELINE AND GRIEVANCES/REMORSES

The first remarks about the NEPAD is what Taylor calls “a false start” referring to his book’s title.¹² In its introduction, the NEPAD framework starts with this statement:

This *New Partnership for Africa’s Development* is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world (P. 1).¹³

“[B]ased on a common vision and firm and shared conviction” are words that, in my opinion, does not reflect what Africa has gone through since Europeans established countries. While others embraced communist, socialist or liberal economies, they remained divided by barriers such as languages, religions and further skin color. Furthermore, there are numerous sub-organizations struggling to reach their goals and objectives, it would be wiser to strengthen those organizations before moving forth. In my view, it was just, as the document stipulates in the third point, because “[c]oncerning the other element of the binomial – aid – we can also note the reduction of private aid and the upper limit of public aid, which is below the target set in the 1970s.” As any good observer of African politics can notice, there is less unity in African heads of states unless concerning grievances to the developed countries and yielding for foreign aid to take advantage of. While they underline the will of Africans to “extricate themselves and the continent from

¹² Op cit.

¹³ Op cit.

the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world”, they recognize that Africa has not been marginalized neither excluded later on. In effect, in the 19th point of the document, one can read:

For centuries, Africa has been integrated into the world economy mainly as a supplier of cheap labour and raw materials. Of necessity, this has meant the draining of Africa’s resources rather than their use for the continent’s development. The drive in that period to use the minerals and raw materials to develop manufacturing industries and a highly skilled labour force to sustain growth and development was lost. Thus, Africa remains the poorest continent despite being one of the most richly endowed regions of the world (P. 5).

This leads to a contradictory language. In addition, all the points in the document, instead of emphasizing facts and will, relate a historic background built on attacks towards colonization. Still, the authors recognize the lack of human resources at that time, which impedes seriously the takeoff. While the document starts on a recollection of exclusion, it states “Africa has been integrated into the world economy mainly as a supplier of cheap labour and raw materials.” No matter how was this integration, the world economy encompasses Africa and Africans did not take advantage of it. Speaking about economy calls to mind the market and in a market, it is the agents’ responsibility to benefit either as suppliers or buyers. Another contrast appears when they focus on the fact of democracy and Africa as a whole to get rid of poverty and underdevelopment. It says:

Across the continent, Africans declare that we will no longer allow ourselves to be conditioned by circumstance. We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts. There are already signs of progress and hope. Democratic regimes that are committed to the protection of human rights, people-centred development and market-oriented economies are on the increase. African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership. These developments are, however, uneven and inadequate and need to be further expedited (P. 1).

In the light of what is happening in the continent one should ask himself, what the words “[a]cross the continent, African...” encompass. Do they refer to African heads of states or the ordinary peoples? It is evident the ordinary peoples call for development and a better life and the leaders hear this call every day. However, their behavior displays the contrary. They stay in power for long and, if it happens they die while in power, their close relatives replace them by way of manipulation of constitutions and elections. In Democratic Republic of Congo, Kabila’s son replaced his father who died during a coup; in Togo Faure Gnassingbé took presidency under an obvious hostage taking of constitution; and a similar thing happened recently in Gabon when Omar Bongo Odimba died and his son was elected President. Let us recall Omar Bongo was the second president of Gabon who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009 (42 years!). A similar projection is expected to happen in Cameroon where Paul Biya has been ruling for over twenty years and is not keen to share the power or give it up. In order to “call on the rest of the world to complement [the] efforts,” good governance is necessary.

One could expect the chapter on “[t]he new political will of African leaders” has settled this misbehavior. Unfortunately, this is not the case. On the contrary, it lists the facts of “African democracy” which is clearly a mock democracy. Presidents are elected and can run forever for the presidency. If, at the beginning of the after Cold War era, most constitutions of these countries stipulate two mandates, they underwent modification to allow the people in power to run forever (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, etc.). While the document stresses transparency and good governance as African leaders will, another consideration is that African heads of states seem to be the most corrupt. The long list at point 49 is following:

- Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the subregional and continental levels, and to ensure that these mechanisms are used to restore and maintain peace;
- Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions, by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participatory governance at the national and subnational levels;
- Restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability, especially by developing appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing appropriate institutional frameworks to achieve these standards
- Instituting transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and the auditing of private companies and the public sector;
- Revitalising and extending the provision of education, technical training and health services, with high priority given to addressing the problem of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases;
- Promoting the role of women in social and economic development by reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and training; by developing revenue generating activities through facilitating access to credit; and by assuring their participation in the political and economic life of African countries;
- Building the capacity of the states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, and to maintain law and order;
- Promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification into agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic and export markets (P. 10).

What a wonderful list of tasks to achieve African development! However, it seems the approval of the document either happened without analysis by heads of states, at least for those who are not willing to give up the power, or just because they needed to avoid arguing about obvious moves towards development. And as Taylor says in an article title, it “ignores the fundamental politics of Africa”¹⁴ because it was written by, perhaps, bureaucrats that wanted African heads of states to endorse their ideas and dreams.

¹⁴ Taylor, Ian. "Nepad Ignores the Fundamental Politics of Africa." *Contemporary Review*, no. 1662 (2004): 29-32.

For example, the resources mobilization chapter is mostly utopian. It calls on domestic savings from households and enterprises. While they recognize at the beginning that half of the African population lives under \$U.S1 a day and African enterprises have difficult access to capital market, they still hope savings to increase in order to fill the gap in resources needed. Moreover, with an unstable environment filled with conflicts and insecurity, they expect overseas development assistance through government bonds. The African economy is an economy that runs under pure uncertainty, and investment in this country needs high-risk lovers or, in other terms financial kamikazes to do so. How developed countries could possibly hand out their government bonds to people that are incapable of aid management? A hypothesis on obligations to pay for these bonds could be a constraint; however, since those who will engage the continent will not be there for the payment the scenario cannot be different. African leaders seem selfish and are, to quote Ian Taylor,¹⁵ the “source of many of the continent’s problems” (P. 30).

Concerning AGOA, it is likely far to be an altruist act from the United States. It is clear, the act authorizing trade benefits with sub-Saharan countries as shows,¹⁶ it is set “in the mutual interest of both Africa and the United States to promote stable and sustainable economic growth and development in sub-Saharan-Africa” (Section.102(1)). The question we should ask ourselves is why such a sudden interest to enhance trade with Africa? In the same section one can also read that the “sub-Saharan Africa represents a

¹⁵ Taylor, Ian. "Partnership through Accomodation? The Tensions between The "Africa-Owned" Development Initiatives and Universal Policy Prescriptions." (2005), http://eadi.org/gc2005/confweb/papersps/Ian_Taylor.pdf.

¹⁶ United States. *An Act to Authorize a New Trade and Investment Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, Expand Trade Benefits to the Countries in the Caribbean Basin, Renew the Generalized System of Preferences, and Reauthorize the Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O. : Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., distributor, 2000.

region of enormous economic potential and of enduring political significance to the United States” (Section 102(3)). This is the answer to our question confirmed by James S. Guseh and Emmanuel O. Oritsejafor¹⁷ when they write that “AGOA is considered a unilateral position taken by the U.S. to further strip Africans of their democratic rights to determine an effective economic policy that will serve their interests” (P. 135). In fact, one can explain this doubt or pessimistic perception of AGOA because the negotiations are conducted between governments instead of including business owners, whether small or big business in Africa or in the United States. It is no wonder most American entrepreneurs could take advantage of the program because the technology and the easy information diffusion they dispose of, but it is not likely the case for their African counterparts who struggle to get the small fundamentals to settle their enterprises. Selina Cuff¹⁸ reports that, in Kenya, business owners have not seen any change and that access to markets and capital are not possible yet. Some authors argue that AGOA mainly benefits the oil sector rather than other sectors such as manufacturing and industry.¹⁹ This is to say that the United States developed the AGOA and that that latter increases oil trade between the United States and Africa. In effect during the hearing of the House of Representatives,²⁰ it was clearly stated that the United States “has a growing interest in

¹⁷ Op cit.

¹⁸ Cuff, Selina. "Agoa: A Goer or a Goner?" *African Business*, no. 357 (2009): 84-85.

¹⁹ Nelufule, Avhafari Alpheus, and Colorado State University. Dept. of Economics. "Africa Growth and Opportunity Act in the Context of Southern African Development Community : Fdi, Trade, Regionalism and Economic Growth." 2005.

Cuff, Selina. "Agoa: A Goer or a Goner?" *African Business*, no. 357 (2009): 84-85.

Guseh, J., and E. Oritsejafor. "The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 10, no. 1 (2009): 123-42.

²⁰ United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on, Africa. *The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline : A New Model for Natural Resource Development : Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One*

Africa's energy development. By 2015, up to 25 percent of U.S oil imports are expected to come from Africa.” Thus, it is not a big surprise the AGOA takes advantage of oil trade in Africa.

Like any program run by governments or political organs, the AGOA and the NEPAD do not lack critics and detractors. The main concern is that programs developed by political leaders are only good intentions. However, they remain in the spot of the anarchy praised by realists. For this school of thoughts, international politics is an arena of mistrust and only self-help is the rule.²¹ Hence, what drives the NEPAD and the AGOA are states' interests. African heads of states developed the NEPAD because they want to enhance their capacity while the United States is looking forward to enhancing its trade and take advantage on raw materials and natural resources that could provide Africa development tools it needs. Both programs recognize the huge amount of natural and human resources that Africa contains. Despite their separate initiation, the two programs share some common patterns.

COMMON PATTERNS AND CONDITIONS

While the AGOA was under development at the end of the 1990s so was the NEPAD. The question is why there was not consultation on such programs so they could be integrated? Was it the African pride or the American neglect of African heads of states? These could be, by themselves, objects of inquiry. However, although different actors developed the programs, they share common goals, which are sustained development and

Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, April 18, 2002. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. [Congressional Sales Office], 2002.

²¹ Oye, Kenneth A. *Cooperation under Anarchy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Baldwin, David A. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism : The Contemporary Debate*, New Directions in World Politics. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993.

economic growth. The common words used for this fact are “sustained development, economic growth and integration of African economy into the world economy.” Those words or phrases are throughout both programs framework. If this is to be achieved, conditions and prerequisite are necessary.

In comparison to Eastern Europe and the Balkans, security within and amidst countries in Africa is essential for economic growth. Security is what business owners need to grow and further their activities. Unfortunately, the African scene does not offer too many such conditions. Coups, rebellions and political instability characterize the African environment. In addition to these “African plagues,” there are clientelism, despotism and corruption all over. If locals cannot launch enterprises for fear of losing them, it is not likely foreigners would be willing to launch bigger ones. Especially in countries exploiting oil, the exploitation areas are secured thanks to government intervention while the companies that exploit these oil fields and related companies bribe or corrupt official to get the work papers done, it is not likely for smaller enterprises’ owners to get involved in these markets with special characteristics. They are neither liberal markets nor informal. Richard Ilorah²² points out this paradox:

Another serious problem that caused failures of the OAU’s economic programmes was that Africa was, and still is, considered too risky as an investment destination, not only by foreigners but also by Africans themselves. This lack of trust is not groundless considering that, until in recent years, several African countries were ruled by either military dictators, as in Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Ethiopia and Uganda, among others, or military-turned-civilian dictators, as in Zaire (presently the DRC), Angola, and Somalia (presently without a legitimate central government), just to name a few. It has also become a general perception, particularly by the rich Western countries, that it does not really make any difference which regime is in power in an African country — military or a democratically elected civilian government — if either way they succeed to

²² Op cit.

entrench themselves in such a manner that there is no effective chance of displacing them (P. 238).

Another consideration to take in account is good governance. Good governance implies accountability and transparency. With characteristics such these described above, it is clear many African leaders have accountability to nobody except those who support them through diplomatic ways or by financing their action while they were opponents to regimes they replaced. In effect Taylor²³ confirms this lack of accountability to the people by saying that:

Nepad (and studies endorsing its credibility) ignore the reality that power in African politics must be understood as the utilization of patrimonial power and not as the performance of legitimacy drawn from the sovereign will of the people. In other words, in spite of the façade of the modern state, power in most African politics progresses informally, between patron and client along lines of political reciprocity, is intensely personalized, and is not exercised on behalf of the public good (P.46).

It is not only the NEPAD that exists in an environment in which any person who aspires to rule a country has no other way than a coup or a rebellion. The AGOA, which pretends to foster economic growth through trade, also does. Unless business owners who feel comfortable with corruption and bribery – and who are looking for money laundering strategies – any business that analyses risks and advantages would not risk itself there. Or, more precisely because, to use a blogger's answer to her writer, "[i]f only this were a world in which all people lived in flourishing democracies...But there are many unsavory governments with which the United States does business, and boycotting all of them

²³ Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

would be impractical and probably counterproductive.”²⁴ If a recent AGOA report shows a substantive amelioration from 2005 to 2008 in the table1 below,²⁵ questions need be asked what could probably be the sources of this amelioration. According to the International Trade Administration, through the AGOA program, the net exchange between Africa and the United States rose by 28.0 percent due to common increases in imports and exports. This period represents the change to interest in African oil by the United States and can explain this improvement. In effect, U.S exports are mostly equipment sold to countries exploiting oil and American products sold to American workers in there, whereas imports represent oil importation and garments from South Africa. This result is not surprising considering what summarized Rabah Arezki and Markus Brückner²⁶ in the abstract of their working paper:

an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.

Table 1: U.S.-African Trade profile

U.S trade with Sub-Saharan Africa (\$ Millions)				
	2005	2006	2007	2008
U.S Exports	10,210.7	11,859.7	14,296.1	18,471.9
U.S Imports	50,364.6	59,092.8	67,357.8	86,052.7

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census

²⁴ Prudence. "Should I Sleep with the Nanny?" *Slate Magazine*, Thursday, March 4, 2010, at 6:44 AM ET available at: <http://www.slate.com/id/2246592> 2010.

²⁵ International Trade Administration, Department of commerce. "U.S - African Trade Profile." Department of Commerce, http://agoa.gov/resources/US_African_Trade_Profile_2009.pdf.

²⁶ Rabah Arezki, and Markus Brückner. "Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions." (2009).

To summarize, in order to reduce poverty and enhance African development two conditions are necessary. The first one concerns political stability and security. Achieving security and stability will require an implementation of a real democracy, not a mock democracy run by despot African leaders more concerned by their own wealth rather than the people. If there are ethnic and armed conflicts in most countries, the reason is that so far it is the only way for people aspiring to rule and contribute from the top to their country's wealth. Unfortunately, when people reach the president seat they stay there and do not want to give an opportunity to others. Examples are all over throughout the continent since the advent of "democracy". Many of leaders who came in power at that time, or less before, are still in power (Chad, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia), were overthrown by others more sticky to the power (Central African Republic, Niger, Guinea Conakry) or - for those who pay obedience to the former colonial powers - are simply replaced by their offspring during a tragic accident (Democratic Republic of Congo) or natural death (Togo and Gabon). Business and development call for a stable and secure environment in which they can flourish, not an uncertain one where there is more of a chance to lose more than to gain.

The second condition is transparency and good governance. There is a joke in Central Africa saying "who is foolish enough to organize elections and lose it in favor of someone else" and people attribute it to Omar Bongo Odimba, the former President of Gabon. In most countries in Africa, results of elections seem to be known in advance. After riots and instability characterized elections (Chad, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ivory Coast and, recently, Gabon and Togo), dissatisfaction nurtures armed conflicts and rebellions. Not only are political arenas subject to lack of transparency but so too are

economic arenas. Corruption and clientelism discourage business starters or people who are less likely to involve themselves in such practices. Thus, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of development and economic growth, the AGOA and the NEPAD should tackle these plagues accordingly, for Africa should take advantage of this opportunity to trade with the United States, and the latter will benefit from the fullness of resources available in the continent. Unfortunately, it seems despite their common goals, these two programs run on parallel roads. The following paragraph will underline and explain how.

OPPORTUNITIES AND PARTNERSHIP IN PARALLEL

A deep analysis of the NEPAD objectives shows clearly it is just a subtle copy of the Millennium Development Goals defined by the United Nations in 2000. It is understandable since the NEPAD was approved a year after this declaration. Unlike taking advantage of programs and strategies defined by developed countries upon which depends heavily the success of the NEPAD, the program completely ignores them and pretends to build its own path. In order to have access to developed countries' market and create incentives to invest in Africa, it should at least mention a closer partnership of existing strategies or similar upcoming strategies. Doing so will help any developed country to seek a slot within the program and integrate it. Of course, it does so in terms of the action from heads of states to:

Secure and stabilise preferential treatment by key developed country partners, e.g. the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), the Cotonou Agreement, the "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGO) (art.169).

Article 184 also mentions them in terms of continuing partnership with developed countries and outlines in the following article a long list of responsibilities and obligations (13) of developed countries and international organizations though theirs are

repetition of what developed countries and the indexed International Organizations have been asking them to achieve since the end of the Cold War. The conclusive list is a sort of irony: corrupt leaders advocating for the fight against corruption. One of the main contributors to this program, the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, was reported recently having attempted to corrupt an IMF former head of office with up to \$U.S 200,000 supposed to be a gift.²⁷ This shows a divergence of the pursuit of development by African leaders, their intentions and acts. From this perspective, it is likely that African leaders will miss the opportunity that their counterparts in developed countries will consider them seriously and will integrate their will and needs to their policies. In such a case, the prime goal is to serve their own interests rather than benefit the people.

The United States considers itself a country that is radically against corruption and does not allow it even for suspicion. It is then hardly thinkable to expect it cooperate with corrupt leaders in order to improve locals' life conditions. Since it is the world of self-interests, there is no need to worry about others when the concerned are less worried about it. Thus, the two programs run in parallel ways whether practically or theoretically.

Practically, the two have nearly same duration of approbation by their authorities. While AGOA is at its 13th years, the NEPAD heads into its 10th. However, these three years of difference show a huge gap between them. If NEPAD is to bridge the gap and yet still misses the opportunity to take advantage of partners' strategies, it is likely it will increase the gap rather than bridge it. In fact, it is easier to find data and reports on the AGOA's website while the rebuilt website of the NEPAD²⁸ recalls the same features.

²⁷ BBC. "Senegal Admits Imf 'Money Gift' " In *BBC News*. London: BBC, 2009.

²⁸ Last accessed on February 15th, 2010.

Other than the program description, its partnership and the structures, there are only the framework and the “dialogues issues” one can find while visiting the NEPAD’s website. On the contrary, the AGOA’s website has many interesting features going through legislation to analyses and opportunities. This already shows a big gap in the management of the programs. The permanent secretariat of NEPAD, now the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), keeps posting events without posting reports by country. Posting reports would show progress and help people understand what they have done and what needs be accomplished for upcoming calendars. Advocating bridging the gap in technology and infrastructures between African countries and developed countries, the program itself seems way behind while opportunities do not lack for such an institution to catch up easily.

Theoretically, there is much to say about NEPAD. It looks much as a copy-and-paste strategy emphasizing a broad range of sectors while speaking vaguely about actions Africans need take to make it successful. Claiming it is a special will and determination of heads of states in Africa, it barely looks like they are seeing the reality. Pillars are supposed to be peace and security, good governance and transparency, but African leaders head too much in the opposite direction rather than towards this goal. Recent events such those happening in Nigeria with pseudo ethnic/religious conflicts lead too far from the goal that is within five years, because like the MDGs, it aims at 2015 to reach a sustainable path of sustainable development. In opposition to the vagueness of the NEPAD legislature and implementation, things are clearer for the AGOA. Specific tasks and actions are delegated to special institutions to achieve and results are set out to show it.

In sum, the AGOA and the NEPAD have the same goal: Africa's development. Whereas the NEPAD has a wide range of priority sectors, the AGOA aims at a specific one, which is the trade option. However, the latter shows more progress and efficacy than the first. In effect, information and data does not lack for the AGOA analysis, but finding such data for the latter is not easy at all to outline progress. Though they should help reach the same outcome, the AGOA and the NEPAD work separately and at different speeds of implementation. While the AGOA represents a better means to reach one of the wider consumption markets, which is the American market, it passes completely unseen just by slight mention in the NEPAD framework letting readers to wonder what exactly it can be. Since it is hard for Americans to converse with those who do not speak English, it is the Anglophone countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Botswana etc.) that take the most advantage of the AGOA. However, if these programs emphasize gender to enhance their success but miss to enforce its theoretical approach, they miss another piece of development that is the African diasporas.

MISSING PIECE TO LEADING TO SUCCESS

It cannot be enough to emphasize the role of the gender approach in African development theory though there are many approaches from the feminist perspective of gender to development. However, there is another piece of development that calls for consideration because of its importance to the continent whether economically or politically.

It may be a great mistake to assert African diasporas started with a "brain drain" that includes immigration. In the beginning, the word designated "the movement of the Jewish people away from ancient Palestine, to settle in other countries" but later

expresses “the spreading of people from a national group or culture to other areas.” Thus, as a group of people who had left their homes for a purpose, the African diasporas play a great role in African countries politically, socially and economically. Thus African diasporas are migrants and as Saskia Sassen²⁹ argues the “new migrant workforce [is one of the] two major instances of transnational categories/actors that have unifying properties across borders and find themselves in contestation with each other” (P. xx). Claire Mercer, Ben Page and Martin Evans³⁰ argue that their “contribution to development goes further than the mobilization of resources” (P. 228) and that they “invest in things that would not normally be included in the usual list of development projects” (P. 232). This applies to recent displaced/migrated people. However, speaking about the African diaspora can go back to the triangular trade of slavery times. If at that time, the forced people brought to the United States could not contribute to their homes but stayed spiritually connected and hoping to return,³¹ it is no more the case nowadays thanks to slavery’s end and the progress of technology. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza³² argues that before the 1950s, the phrase “African diaspora” did not exist and refers to it as “a process, a condition, a space, and a discourse... a state of being and a process of becoming, a kind of voyage that encompasses the possibility of never arriving or returning, a navigation of multiple belongings, of networks of affiliation” (P. 32). He continues by concluding that:

²⁹ Sassen, Saskia. *Globalization and Its Discontents : [Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money]*. New York: New Press, 1998.

³⁰ Op cit.

³¹ Haley, Alex. *Roots*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976.

³² Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe. "Diaspora Dialogues: Engagement between Africa and Its Diaspora." In *The New African Diaspora*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

The interconnections between diasporic communities, the flows which they generate with Africa, and the processes of globalization with which they are implicated are critical questions to investigate. There can be little doubt that current diasporic processes, linkages, and flows are part of the contemporary processes of globalization. Clearly, African diasporas are crucial, indeed indispensable, for Africa's globalization and the Africanization of globalization (P.53).

In another contribution³³ to Thandika Mkandawire's book,³⁴ he acknowledges that the definition of the African Diaspora poses a problem of origin in time due to the difficult conception of the term "diaspora" itself. People out of Africa can communicate, travel, send money and trade with their home countries thanks to technological progress. In short, they remain connected to the motherland in different ways that make them real contributors to its development. However, Andrew Niikando³⁵ questions this relation and calls it a weaker one that makes some African diasporas less eager to return or invest back home. While most scholars are trying to understand why Africans flee their countries, political and social environments in which they cannot bloom despite their skills, knowledge and competencies give the answer. In his contribution to Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu's book³⁶ answers concluding that:

various reasons [explain] why millions of Africa's "talented tenth" left and continue to leave for the West or for rich countries [amidst others] political conflicts or civil wars; lack of economic and political freedoms; low salaries; lack of facilities and encouragement of professionals; and lack of social services, especially uninterrupted electricity (P.119).

³³ Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe. "The Academic Diaspora and Knowledge Production in and on Africa: What Role for Codeseria?" In *African Intellectuals : Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender, and Development*. Dakar: Zed Books, 2003.

³⁴ Mkandawire, P. Thandika. *African Intellectuals : Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender, and Development*. New York: Zed Books, 2003.

³⁵ Niikando, Andrew. "Pan Africanism and the African Diaspora: A Weak Cooperation in the Current International Arena." In *Pan-Africanism/African Nationalism : Strengthening the Unity of Africa and Its Diaspora*. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2008.

³⁶ Okpewho, Isidore, and Nkiru Nzegwu. *The New African Diaspora*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

The real question to ask concerns their contributions to improve these situations/conditions for those who remain back home but not the reasons since it appears clear for everyone. In fact, they contribute through remittances and development projects in their home communities. No doubt, they contribute to their communities on the basis of self-determination and communities support; however, they cannot be a substitute for policymakers such as governments and international organizations. Nonetheless, since they sought and (some) have found opportunities, the local government should develop and implement policies – instead of host governments as the contributors to Okpewo's collection argue – that help them invest in their home countries. As said above, to invest, the major condition is peace and security. To achieve peace and security requires political stability; one of the NEPAD cornerstones that is missing in most of the countries in Africa. Even though the diaspora seems be out of reach of poverty, their counterparts on the continent live in, the political, economical and social environments in Africa is one of their great concerns. Many diaspora conferences held in the continent,³⁷ the United States³⁸ and elsewhere³⁹ are proof that they want to be a part of it and contribute to its development. I recall how it was hard to find a spot to fit the diaspora in during the launching⁴⁰ of the ECOSOCC (Economic, Social, and Cultural Council) temporary general assembly in 2005. The representatives had to argue with the organizing committee even though African Union had defined in previous year clearly the role and

³⁷ Mkandawire, P. Thandika. *African Intellectuals : Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender, and Development*. New York: Zed Books, 2003.

³⁸ All African Students, Conference, B. F. Bankie, and K. J. McHombu. *Pan-Africanism/African Nationalism : Strengthening the Unity of Africa and Its Diaspora*, All African Students Conference. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2005.

³⁹ Okpewho, Isidore, and Nkiru Nzegwu. *The New African Diaspora*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

⁴⁰ Held from March 27-30, 2005 at the African Union Headquarter in Addis Abba (Ethiopia) during which I represented CELIAF, a Chadian NGO.

the place of the diasporas. Zeleza quotes the African Union definition of the diasporas as following:

The African Union has committed itself to providing representation to the African Diaspora in its policy process. For this purpose, we recommend that the definition of African Diaspora refer(s) to the geographic dispersal of people whose ancestors, within historical memory, originally came from Africa, but who are currently domiciled, or claim residence or citizenship, outside the continent of Africa. This definition recognizes both dispersal and subsequent reconstitution of African Diaspora identities in new locations as equally important elements. Therefore, such peoples are committed to the advancement of continental African and Diaspora communities worldwide (P. 35).

Unfortunately, the sad thing to say is that the diasporas is less listened to on the continent. Unlike Zeleza⁴¹ who considers two types of diasporas, the historic and contemporary diasporas, it is important to consider three types of Africans abroad: those who fled their countries for political reasons, those for economical reasons, and those sent abroad by the leaders in place. These are my concerns in this section. One can also argue they belong to the contemporary diasporas. The historic diaspora is less my concern since they mostly are in a research of roots and personal identities to corroborate Zeleza's definition of diaspora, which is:

a form of group consciousness constituted historically through expressive culture, politics, thought, and tradition, in which experiential and representational resources are mobilized, in varied measures from the imageries of both the old and the new worlds (P.33).

Because the first have fled for security reasons, let us name them the security diaspora. They emphasized transparency and good governance, often fustigating their governments. They mostly pretend to govern and the governments in place look at them

⁴¹ Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe. "Diaspora Dialogues: Engagement between Africa and Its Diaspora." In *The New African Diaspora*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

as enemies rather than political adversaries. Some of them were even killed or jailed abroad thanks to complicity of local intelligence or government collaboration. Most of these opponents to whom these incidents happened lived in France or other African countries. Whether their opinions are worth something or not, they are not welcome expressing their opinions.⁴²

The economic diaspora, depending on from where they fled, are more concerned with the daily life. They seek means and ways to support their relatives they left behind. Their daily struggles are to find jobs, and to make money to sustain both their lives in the host countries and their relatives. They tend not to discuss political issues or express opinions. They join the afro-pessimism trend that believes there is no hope for Africa to develop. On rare occasion, they raise their voice to join with the security diaspora because they fear the regimes in place will take revenge jailing or persecuting their family's members.

The pro government diaspora, so called, are people supported by their governments, and who are less likely to accept any blame on their governments. These kinds of diasporas are diplomatic representatives and students who receive their financial supports from the governments. Because most of them are likely to be government secret agents, they design the former diasporas as people who are desperate and who criticize their home countries' government just to stay in the host countries. They have the duty to

⁴² Baker, B. *Escape from Domination in Africa: Political Disengagement & Its Consequences*: Africa World Pr, 2001.

Halisi, CRD. "From Liberation to Citizenship: Identity and Innovation in Black South African Political Thought." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 39, no. 01 (1997): 61-85.

Wiseman, JA. *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*: Burns & Oates, 1995.

Olukoshi, Adebayo O., and Afrikainstitutet Nordiska. *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa*. Uppsala; Stockholm: Nordic Africa Institute (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet) ; Almqvist & Wiksell International [distributör], 1998.

re-gild the image of the government when it is criticized. Thus, we have conflicts between the security and the pro-government diasporas, leading to less cooperation.

Despite their internal conflicts, the security, the economic and the pro-government diasporas constitute a critical force upon which Africa can build its development policies and strategies. These diasporas have the potential to contribute to African development at a higher level. As people living in countries where they have opportunities to trade with their home countries, they are well placed to take advantage of programs such as the AGOA initiative and Cotonou agreements. They can develop small enterprises in their home countries and constitute a counter force to compete with the multinationals that are taking over the continent markets through their huge capitals. As natives, a term they hate according to Louis E. Lomax,⁴³ they are well aware of local business opportunities and can take advantage of them.

In summary, in this chapter, I discussed whether NEPAD is a real innovation or a reform of previous policies and strategies. An analysis of the framework led to a discovery of inconsistencies and contradictions in the actions needed and the practice on the continent. The pillars of the program are the responsibility of leaders for implementation. Unfortunately, the leaders are, at least for most of them, the puppets of the west, which they blame for historical causes in one hand, and who support their mismanagement of the people in the other hand. Mostly, it is clear that the NEPAD is an instrument developed by African heads of states to achieve the MDGs that are the focus of the documents. The remaining is just a list of actions that they need to accomplish in order to provide their peoples the decent living conditions for which they have been

⁴³ Lomax, Louis E. *The Reluctant African*. New York: Harper, 1960.

aspiring for decades since the independence days. The program has run for merely a decade without a noticeable advancement and less recognition by Africans themselves and the remaining world. The noise it made at the beginning faded and remains more utopian than concrete. The program does not provide enough information (reports, data, etc.) to assert where it stands in term of progress. This stalling makes many Africans believe it is just another wake-up African heads of states came up with and they went slowly to sleep back while the NEPAD Permanent Coordinating Agency watches their reign over peoples. Rather than integrating completely their partners' strategies already in place and improving their commitment to ameliorating their peoples living conditions, the NEPAD initiators made just a mention without providing tools and instruments for Africans to take advantage of the strategies that could improve the access to developed countries' markets. The AGOA is one program for access which is my concern in this paper and appears only twice in the framework (art. 169 and 184).

The African Growth and Opportunity Act is a U.S program initiated to improve trade between the sub-Saharan Africa and the United States. Unfortunately, it missed a key element, which is the implication of the concerned countries. The eligibility of beneficiary countries is at the sole determination of the president of the United States who decides which country will benefit of it. Statistically well documented and in its thirteenth year, this program proves to benefit more to countries exploiting oil, those speaking English and allies of the United States, to the detriment of those that represent less interest to the United States. Thus, I argue that because of the well known characteristics of African leaders, the policymakers in the United States are less keen to collaborate deeply in the implementation of the program.

Despite their different speeds and lack of collaboration, the programs aim at the same goal - African development – and need to consider appropriate conditions such as good governance, transparency, security, peace and the eradication of corruption in order to achieve their goals. In addition to these conditions, missing pieces remain such as gender and the diasporas. Though the AGOA aims at small businesses, especially women-owned small businesses, there are fewer traces of women's success in data and reports found on their websites.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter is, first, to summarize what I developed in previous chapters. My concern for this research is to compare the NEPAD and the AGOA in terms of cooperative strategies in order to find common patterns on which both programs can build and achieve success. It is difficult to define success in a wide range of understanding; however, I aim at the social success that encompasses peace and security for African peoples struggling everyday for survival. As African heads of states developed the NEPAD and have the responsibility to successfully implement it, it is erroneous to assert at first glance they have succeeded according to the current security climate in African countries. Second, as a summary, this chapter will recall development strategies before the NEPAD and the AGOA to assert their failure or success, then outline the analysis made here. After these steps, I will suggest conditions to make AGOA and NEPAD cooperate to enhancing African development. A section of future research topics and limits of the study will close the chapter.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND APPLIED STRATEGIES

It is redundant to say Africa's underdevelopment is due to colonization and slavery. For many authors,¹ Africa is poor and underdeveloped because the triangular

¹ Pakenham, Thomas. *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912*. New York: Avon Books, 1992.

Poku, Nana K., and Jeggan Colley Senghor. *Towards Africa's Renewal*. Aldershot, Hampshire [u.a.]: Ashgate, 2007.

Berg, Robert J., Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Strategies Committee on African Development, Relations Council on Foreign, and Council Overseas Development. *Strategies for African Development : A Study for the Committee on African Development Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

Lomax, Louis E. *The Reluctant African*. New York: Harper, 1960.

trade and colonization had deprived it its workforce through slavery and exploitation of natural and mineral resources by western countries. Not only these countries would have deprived the continent of its vital resources, but they also aggravated the situation through international organizations, namely the World Bank and the IMF, and the globalization process.² However, despite critics and unsatisfied reactions, these programs, especially the SAP, aim at African development. Unfortunately, as Reginald Green³ argues, they are incompatible and inconsistent to African realism. For Joseph Stiglitz⁴ particularly, the IMF has over-expanded its role since the fall of the Berlin Wall and believes everything falls “within its domain” and had been doing so since the oil price crisis in the 1970s. For Manfred Bienefeld,⁵ the IMF’s strategies of opening developing countries markets to developed countries’ companies constitute a risk. In fact, for him:

international market is an arena of struggle in which political and economic dimensions are inextricably intertwined, and in which the more powerful are able to turn many things to their advantage. Certainly it would be wrong to assume that the international financial institutions represent no particular interests or that their ‘neutral’ expertise could play a central role in building up a nation’s capacity to define its ‘national development objectives’ within that context. The task is precisely for each nation (or group of nations) to define its (their) interests. In this

Ake, Claude. *A Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Longman Inc., 1981.

Picard, Louis A., Michele Garrity, and The International Institute of Administrative Sciences. *Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Africa : The Institutional Imperative*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994.

² Gilpin, Robert, and Jean M. Gilpin. *Global Political Economy : Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2002.

Green, Reginald. "Imf Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Are They Technically Compatible?" *IDS Bulletin* 16, no. 3 (1985): 61-68.

Arnold, Guy. *A Guide to African Political & Economic Development*. London; Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001.

³ Op cit.

⁴ Op cit.

⁵ Bienefeld, Manfred. "The Lessons of Africa's Industrial 'Failure'." *IDS Bulletin* 16, no. 3 (1985): 69-77.

regard, it is one of the most difficult tasks to develop an ability to say 'No!' to someone offering finance for a project that he claims to have shown viable (P.75).

This pretention to having responses to all economic questions, especially macroeconomic one, is responsible for many mistakes made by the IMF and the World Bank that harmed many less developed countries.⁶ Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner⁷ acknowledge that historical legacy to Africa and ethnic diversity are not the sole factors of its slow growth leading to underdevelopment. If critics see this effort crowned with failures as acts of remorse from the West, the reality shows Africans themselves attempted to promote their development.

In effect, as underlined by several scholars and writers⁸ Africans have been trying for long time to settle their underdevelopment. It started with the creation of the Organization of African Unity – now African Union – and Lagos Plan. Unfortunately, as I argued in the second chapter, inherited boundaries indicted as being the cause of problems in Africa are not sole causes. Other unseen causes, such as languages, and religions, shape communities and play important role in conflicts and wars happening in

⁶ Gilpin, Robert, and Jean M. Gilpin. *Global Political Economy : Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001.

⁷ Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. "Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies." *J Afr Econ* 6, no. 3 (1997): 335-76.

⁸ Arnold, Guy. *A Guide to African Political & Economic Development*. London; Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001.

Adebajo, Adekeye. "Africa and America in an Age of Terror." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 38, no. 2-3 (2003): 2-3.

Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004.

Ake, Claude. *A Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Longman Inc., 1981.

Loxley, John. "Imperialism & Economic Reform in Africa: What's New About the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad)?" *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 95 (2003): 119-28.

the continent. Arnold⁹ outlines the divide over religious apparatus amidst African countries and their influence on cooperation for development (Pp. 155-65). Moreover, international organizations and former colonial powers had designed the North, dominated by Islamic to belong to the group of Middle East and North Africa. Africa finds itself divided in two pieces, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa – on top of the colonial sharing at the Berlin Conference. Other organizations again distinguish Africa in terms of geographical axis (North, South, West and East). The African Union does not do much to settle this divide when within itself there are five sections of Africa: Central Africa, Western Africa, Southern Africa, Eastern Africa and Northern Africa.

In addition to these factors, the political management of the continent constitutes another obstacle to its development. For over forty years after the end of World War II and during the Cold War, all African countries seem to be ruled by unique parties. The fact received support from western countries and the United States. Because of the fear leaders in search of power would turn to the former Soviet Union and strengthen its impact on the world, coups, rebellions and dark business practices sustain leaders in power for long time. This changes a little after the end of the Cold War in early 1990s.¹⁰ In fact, with the end of the Cold War, the trend turned to Africa's democratization. Leaders reluctant to break up with old ways of ruling were just dethroned by their former partners as the case of Hisseine Habré, former president of Chad, shows. Unfortunately, those who knew how to satisfy the western partners' politics remained in power and continued to rule by pretending democracy. Still, with the tragic event at the beginning of

⁹ Op cit.

¹⁰ Walle, Nicola Van de. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979 - 1999*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

21st century in the United States, the 9/11 attack, African partners are taking a similar path again. In effect, with terrorist groups' number increasing, the United States which has declared the war on terror is seeking allies. Thus, it manages to keep African leaders in power despite the disdain their peoples manifest. In another focus, France still holds a patrimonial power over its former colonies and indirectly conducts their policies and politics in a way that controls their "advancement." The replacement of Félix Houphouët-Boigny by his adoptive son Henry Konan Bédié in Ivory Coast, in Togo Gnassingbé Eyadema by his son Gnassingbé Faure, of Omar Bongo Odimba in Gabon by his son Alain Bongo, and the protection accorded to Idriss Deby in Chad during rebels' attack in February 2008 testify to such a behavior. Recent events in Guinea suggest France still has its hands tied to politics in its former colonies.

Thus, despite external programs and internal strategies to develop the continent, it is still stalling and remains behind developed countries. Arnold¹¹ quotes the former French President François Mitterrand acknowledging the fact that "the flow of capital from Africa towards the industrial countries is greater than the flow of capital from the industrial countries to developing countries" (P128). Because international organizations emphasize on economic growth as a criterion of development, it is obvious that the net flow of capital will lead to a deficit exchange. In addition to this difference, it is worth noticing that most African countries are raw material exporters; thus, they are price takers and the industrial countries take advantage on this by selling back the manufactured items that cost more than the raw materials that help make them.

¹¹ Op cit.

In sum, despite the blame for external cause to Africa's underdevelopment – colonization, slavery, bad, inappropriate and imposed policies by International Organizations – Africans remain responsible to their underdevelopment. And as so, they are the only able to set the path to their development. They need first to value their differences that seem to be the roots of their struggles and divide. Thus, languages, religions, tribal and clan apparatus should not be factors of divisions but an asset of values and richness to build upon their development. The real causes of underdevelopment in Africa are in politics, resources redistribution and mismanagement that steer conflicts, corruption and brain drain. There are few and small things that they can do by themselves; however they lack the consciousness to look at it. Greg Mills¹² outlines these things Africa needs do for itself that are not bound to external partners. These are:

1. African leaders should know that Growth begins at home
2. African leaders should ensure differentiation
3. They should also accept their failure to develop their countries
4. They must make sure aid is not only good in quantitative appreciation but qualitative
5. Instead on indicting globalization, Africans should appreciate the good side it could bring to their effort for development,
6. The development debate should expect a positive future of Africa rather than the pessimistic one that always looks back at the causes of underdevelopment and situates them outside of the continent.

¹² Mills, Greg, and Foundation Heritage. *Ten Things That Africa Can Do for Itself*, Heritage Lectures, No. 923. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2006.

7. Growth is not synonymous of development because development does not enclose only economic growth but social service available for their populations. In short, development lays upon good redistribution of the economic growth;
8. Parliaments and NGOs in Africa must be stronger than they are nowadays. Rather than fighting over fancies, they might recognize opposition as an asset rather than hostility
9. Business in Africa needs points of entry to be set by developing local economies rather speaking broadly and vaguely about business development
10. As a definitive point, the emphasis on setting priorities in action is necessary to both international community and Africa.

In a recent interview accorded to media during a conference organized by African Development Bank, Joseph Stiglitz , also stresses on the fact that Africa must rely first on itself because the SAPs have contributed to the deindustrialization of Africa and the continent must orientate its policies towards the emergent markets of Asia.¹³ This advice reinforces certainly African leaders in their choice to make business with China and India towards the end of the 2000s decade.¹⁴

Regardless of what has been done and needs be done, it is important to notice that the social development expected by Africans seems to be far from their reach and it is their leaders' concerns. In order to catch up with the reduction of aid support received

¹³ Kéfi, Walid. 2010. Joseph Stiglitz: z: «L'Afrique doit compter davantage sur elle-même». *Les Afriques*.

¹⁴ Ghazvinian, John H. 2007. *Untapped : the scramble for Africa's oil*. Orlando: Harcourt.
Michel, Serge, Michel Beuret, and Paolo Woods. 2009. *China safari : on the trail of Beijing's expansion in Africa*. New York: Nation Books.

Alden, Chris, Institute International African, and Society Royal African. 2007. *China in Africa, African arguments*. London; New York; Capetown, South Africa; New York: Zed Books ; David Philip ; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan.

from the western or eastern side that maintained dictatorships in Africa, African leaders decided tackle the question of development on their own. They then developed a praised initiative expected to “bridge the gap of development” between the industrial countries. This initiative coincided with an American one aiming at incentive to improve trade between African countries – especially the sub-Saharan Africa – and the United States.

RAILWAY SIDES STRATEGIES

The two programs aim at the same goal, which is African development; but, although they define different objectives and strategic plans, they seem to reconstruct previous initiatives. Thus, they can lead to similar mistakes. While the NEPAD repeats nearly every step of the SAP and MDGs, the AGOA follows the same steps aiming at economic liberalization. As programs that choose to overcome poverty in Africa and enhance security and peace, their success should be analyzed in terms of good social living conditions. These conditions derive from observable results such as number of school, number of hospitals built and the provision of clean water and electricity. Though international organizations that sustain African development publish numbers they pretend showing progress made by these countries, the realm contradicts with these reports and publications. As Elsa Assidon¹⁵ argues, these numbers and statistics from developing countries are often manipulated to satisfy donors and are less valuable to assert their accuracy.

Africans and their partners praise the NEPAD initiative as being an African tool of development. Nonetheless, a close look gave us a mitigated answer. In fact, NEPAD

¹⁵ Assidon, Elsa. *Les Théories Économiques Du Développement*, Collection Repères, 108. Paris: la Découverte, 1992.

recalls pillars of previous programs and policies. Agriculture was the prime approach to develop Africa after independence in the 1960s. Despite the emphasis put on it, the focus was on commercial agriculture such as tobacco, and cotton, and finally it proved to be inefficient. NEPAD recalls the same pillars without specifying methodologies to avoid previous mistakes and to enhance a real impact of agriculture on development.

The chapter on infrastructure building seems a wonderful one since development follows well-established infrastructures. Unfortunately, it is not a novelty. The World Bank has been supplying aid and loans through projects for decade to build up infrastructure in order to overcome isolation that African countries encounter within their territories and among them. In addition, the results show national or transboundary infrastructure projects are kept in desk drawers for decades.

The technology topic deserves a particular attention. In fact, in an era when speed is required in communication and exchange, this is a tool needed to foster African development. Here also, the monitoring structure of the program itself is far behind to take advantage of it. The NEPAD's website is just a representative portal that shows less of what the NPCA has been doing so far. There are no concrete results except meetings and seminars held or to be held.

The real problem facing NEPAD is not the replication of previous strategies. The problem is that NEPAD is a state-driven program directed by those who have been struggling to get Africa out of underdevelopment and poverty for decades. The emphasis on fighting corruption, and establishing peace and security by people stuck to power is unrealistic. No doubt on the competencies of the NPCA to accomplish their tasks, however, the appointers are designed by the heads of states to whom they seem to be

directly responding and not the African Union. Thus, less credibility can drive cooperation from their partners' side in order to foster their vision. Blinded also by the pride to overcome colonization stigma and prove to Westerners their capability of self-determination, the initiators did not integrate existing strategies and programs to implement successfully their program. Moreover, the expertise and "best" competencies in Africa in terms of coups and bad governance show to western partners the futility to believe in people who wake up sometimes to claim outrage, neocolonialism and neopatrimonialism, and other times shout for aid and support. It is in this trend that we can explain why the AGOA initiative treats regardless how profound leaders in Africa comprehend the initiative and integrate it in their policies.

Unlike the NEPAD developed by a number of Heads of States in Africa, AGOA is a unilateral initiative from the United States to help the continent. In its logic of determining space and regions in Africa, the program does not take North of Africa into account, asserting it addresses its opportunity to the sub-Saharan Africa. The objectives of the AGOA are to improve trade exchange between Africa and the United States. This, supposedly, will open some barriers to developing countries in Africa and foster economic growth that constitutes the basis of development in the liberal theory of economics. It mainly attempts to enhance women entrepreneurship in the continent and contributes to gender equity because an economic empowerment of women is a critical factor of equity. Unfortunately, we still see a remake of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) program in Africa. One more time, it is in the logic of the developed countries and international organizations believing that all developing countries have same characteristics and that if one program/strategy works in one of them

it works in others too. However, as Gilpin¹⁶ and Stiglitz¹⁷ show, these are mistakes replicated every time to solve problems or crises. Another reproach to address towards the United States is the unilateral decision to decide for African – whether they are sub-Saharan or North African –without their participation. This reproduces the colonial and imperial acts to dictate countries policies to adopt. It is merely in the straight line of the Washington Consensus infantilizing developing countries. Because western partners believe African countries are not politically mature enough – and they are not wrong according to African leader’s behavior – they have to decide what is good for them. One needs consider Bienefeld’s advice that neglecting the political dimension in Africa is a very early step of failure to any program to achieve development in Africa.¹⁸ Moreover, the benefits gained from the AGOA diverse from countries to countries according to their closeness to the United States through cultural asset such as language, their alliance to fight terrorism, and/or their likeliness to trade with items needed by the United States such as oil, garments, and natural/mineral resources.

I must recognize, however, that comparing the two programs shows net difference in strategies developed in and out Africa so far, and that the AGOA shows to be more effective than the NEPAD. While several mails and phone calls made to the NEPAD secretariat during summer 2009 in order to have data or reports that could strengthen my analysis remained dead letters, and that less useful information is able on the NEPAD website, it was easier for the AGOA. Analysis, reports, articles, and data are available to allow one to “judge” what is going on. This gap shows that the vision of “bridging the

¹⁶ Op cit.

¹⁷ Op cit.

¹⁸ Bienefeld, Manfred. "The Lessons of Africa's Industrial 'Failure'." *IDS Bulletin* 16, no. 3 (1985): 69-77.

gap” advocated by the NEPAD is a light at the end of the tunnel. Despite the advantage of the AGOA, both programs have missed inescapable factors of development. In fact, the African Diasporas have driven little attention to their importance in the programs’ documents.

African Diasporas have become concern for many “developmentalists” – whether institutions, scholars or observers – because of the role it has played for decades in remittances and support given to their relatives and countries. If NEPAD has taken steps to try diasporas’ inclusion, it has not done much. In fact, the African Union in charge of its implementation – unless the supervising institution – has defined the African Diaspora in a vague way without specifying how its inclusion is possible in African development. My argument here is that if someone succeeded to “escape” the poverty in Africa and lives in a developed country, he can contribute to his country’s development in many ways: supporting his relatives left back home, initiating a small business to commercialize local products where he lives, etc. Nonetheless, neither the NEPAD nor the AGOA considers this asset critical to the continent. The diasporas constitute a force Africa cannot neglect if it needs development. Africans abroad cannot all be a magical formula to Africa’s development but they have skills and knowledge Africa can use to foster its development. Despite divisions within the three types I identify in this paper – security, economic and pro-government – they have the same concern: their country should not be a shame for them and a burden for the white men.¹⁹ The diaspora is a set of

¹⁹ Ea Easterly, William Russell. *The White Man's Burden Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*. New York [u.a.]: Penguin Books, 2007.

Holden, Matthew. *The White Man's Burden*. New York: Chandler Pub. Co., 1973.

people who know the opportunities and the potentials of those who live there and are able to drain it towards development.

With this analysis, the NEPAD and the AGOA look like two sides of a railway. They will never meet but can bring the train or the tram at destination. The difficulty resides in the fact that the NEPAD looks more as a jumping rail while the AGOA is a straight one. In order to bring passengers to the destination, the driver has to be careful and avoid crashing.

SUGGESTIONS

It is true to recognize with Bienefeld²⁰ that “there is surely no formula that will solve SSA’s problem in “general”” (P.75), and Africa can still defer its hope for development.²¹ What it needs is perseverance and good politics. No wonder that developed countries today had seen their wealth brought forth by states. In order to achieve this goal, I dare make some suggestions based on my analysis above. Although they cannot be magic wand, a little consideration can help leap ahead to development instead of stalling and dragging legs to better living conditions for African peoples.

According to what has been said so far in this paper, African development strategies are dominated by external influences. In accordance with Bienefeld,²² I advocate for endogenous development. In fact, he argues that “[i]f Africa is to develop its productive forces to benefit its people then it must develop the capacity to manage its integration with the international economy in a manner that allows benefits to be weighed against the attendant risks” (P.75). Concerning the argument of integrating the African

²⁰ Op cit.

²¹ Biggs-Davison, John Alec. *Africa--Hope Deferred*. London: Johnson, 1972.

²² Op cit.

economy in the international economy, arguments put forth both by the NEPAD and the AGOA, he rejects it. He writes “[f]or Africa, the lesson of the past... is not that it has not integrated itself sufficiently into international market. It is rather the opposite: that it has integrated to a degree, and a manner, that has simply proven unmanageable.” (Pp.75-6)

Thus, to comply with Bienefield argument, I found three suggestions useful and workable for African countries. They could prove difficult to implement but are reachable. They are reforms in the armies, in the government and legislative corps, and finally a change of perception and policy development from African partners for development.

Reforms in the army are absolutely necessary. Armies in Africa mostly respond to one person who often is the head of state. Any commander-in-chief aspires to rule the country at one point or another. In other terms, he pays absolute obedience to the president. Armies are the force that makes and undoes presidents in Africa. In most of countries undergoing wars and conflicts, the majority of the army is illiterate and has no professional knowledge or skills. Thus, the only thing they are able to achieve is to pull the trigger and kill those who are against the president they protect because they brought him to power. In order to achieve reforms in the army, professional training, volunteerism and human rights knowledge are necessary.

Professional training for enrolled persons in the armies means signing a contract with the army first to serve for a determined period. It provides tools to these soldiers after disengagement to be active in civilian life and to work in any domain of their training. I am not saying there is not such a program in the army. It exists well, however, all trained are in the administration and they make it a career since most of them are high officers. In most African armies, high officers outnumber troops; which makes them

more difficult to disengage. With professional skills at their disposal, the only alternative is no more the army and they can get out of the army and work for companies or institutions that need their skills and knowledge. Similar to the United States system, they can be on reserve for any needed services that require more troops. It is not a question of schooling adults in the armies; I plead training them in special fields that need not to go through theoretical and ideological streams. It is effective and realizable.

Another reform in the army can be incentives for young people to engage in the army. By young people, I mean students at high schools or colleges to experiment with life in the army. After high school, they can volunteer to engage in the army for a period defined by their respective governments, I would say three years, during which they could serve the armies and attend college receiving free tuition and stipends. Actually, in several countries, students attend college and receive stipends with no service to their countries. After they graduate, they are unemployed and some of them are recruited by rebellions that make promises of a better life. The same songs nurture coups and regime changes without real changes in living conditions. This is an alternative that allows educated soldiers to serve their countries and their people rather than serving their heads of states.

The third and final alternative reform in the armies concerns human rights knowledge. Because armies are trained to fight enemies and to defend their countries, the sole answer to a riot or a manifestation against the regime in place is to shoot people. The religious conflict happened recently in Lagos (Nigeria) between Christians and Muslims shows how soldiers react before certain events. The better they know of human rights, the

better they could respect human beings and provide security to peoples they have a duty to protect rather to frighten.

The reforms in the governments and legislative corps are more likely for the diasporas. The coup in Guinea has brought an implementation of a ministry in charge of Guineans abroad. This is such a good thing. However, it suffices not to establish a ministry in charge of citizens abroad. This ministry for Africans abroad could bring foreign experience into the country; it should build a repertory of citizens abroad and list their competencies. In so doing, in need, and with peace and security, the countries could negotiate with the host countries and employers to use their competencies for a while. The ministry can share it with the national assembly or institutions alike setting up special commission for citizens abroad. Since the commission is a legislative one, it can allow citizens abroad to propose laws and rules that can strengthen judiciary systems in their home countries.

If this responsibility is to be handled effectively, the fight against corruption needs not be done only when leaders are approaching elections, as we can see in Cameroon, Chad and Sierra Leone recently. Corruption is an obstacle to any social change and improvement. If it can be eradicated and bring transparency to African countries, market access can be just a step ahead and economic growth will follow. The redistribution of the economic growth in an environment filled with transparency and trust will definitely lead to better living conditions.

Finally, I suggest that international organizations avoid using similarities in characteristics to develop and implement policies. It is true one cannot invent the wheel, but s/he can still adapt it by size and quality. That is the reason why, in their efforts to

help Africa to develop, they should avoid reproducing strategies and programs that have showed success elsewhere. Even within the continent, the replication of a policy is likely to produce different results in different countries. All aspects, be they social, cultural, political or economical, are to play a critical role and will have different impacts. For the missing piece noticed in the NEPAD and the AGOA programs, it is unavoidable for whoever wants to contribute to African development. In order to understand locals, cooperation with natives living abroad is a requirement. People originating from Africa know, not better but well, how things work. A close cooperation with them can help overcome obstacles and avoid mistakes made by previous attempts of development. However, one should know that partners need not to impose their programs to the locals through the diasporas.

In order to achieve these suggestions a close collaboration between the United States and African countries is necessary. It also calls at internal cooperation among African countries. Similar to the New International Economic Order (NIEO) analyzed by Kempe Ronald Hope,²³ the success of the AGOA and the NEPAD lies in “internal arrangements and the required cooperation between developed and developing countries[if not] there [will] be no complementary” (P. 24). I suggest the two programs establish an independent consultative council/committee. This council/committee will have regular consultation in order to study the directions given to the programs, to advise and develop strategies that improve their implementation. Throughout this responsibility

²³ Hope, Kempe R. *The Dynamics of Development and Development Administration*, Contributions in Economics and Economic History, No. 56. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984.

the committee/council could help avoid the bad impacts of policies developed in developed countries that undergo developing countries;²⁴ especially Africa.

LIMITS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The first limit to this study is the numerous theories of development out there. Development is a transversal concept and interdisciplinary approach and as Hope states “there seems to be much disagreement on what development is and how it should be measured” (P. 3). As such, it is not easy to define and speak about. However, I focused solely on the economic concept and approach of development based upon political constraints. There are other social development concepts such as freedom, trusteeship and ideology, and westernization as laid out by Hameso²⁵ that are not included fully in this approach. The study does not pretend to develop or find ideal solutions for African countries development. However, it is a try to contribute to the scholarly works to understand and find ways and means to African developments. My personal contribution is to have compared two programs that have the same goal but did not take in account each other. This can lead to a comparative analysis for any programs developed unilaterally or conjointly with an African country in order to improve its development.

The implication of this study lies where it has not touched. In effect, questions such as corruption, cultural incidence and political practices in Africa can be other topics of study. Another area that deserves attention is the huge amount of resources in Africa that do not benefit the continent despite what partners and locals have been doing for

²⁴ Picciotto, Robert, and Rachel Weaving. *Impact of Rich Countries' Policies on Poor Countries : Towards a Level Playing Field in Development Cooperation*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004.

²⁵ Hameso, Seyoum Y. *Development, State and Society : Theories and Practice in Contemporary Africa*. San Jose: Authors Choice Press, 2001.

decades since their independence. Diasporas also have driven the attention of scholars but policies do not integrate them in a simple manner that could contribute importantly to Africa's development. Concerning the two programs analyzed in this paper, they are not static but dynamic. Though, this paper does not develop solutions for co-integration, it outlines patterns for collaboration for possible improvement latter.

REFERENCES

- Adebajo, Adekeye. "Africa and America in an Age of Terror." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 38, no. 2-3 (2003): 2-3.
- African Union, The Heads of State Implementation Committee of. "The New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad)." In *Office of the Special Adviser on Africa: United nations: The African Union Heads of State Implementation Committee*, 2001.
- Agubuzu, Lawrence, and Adebayo Adedeji. *African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century : Looking Back to Move Forward : Essays in Honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. New York [u.a.]: Zed Books [u.a.], 2004.
- Ake, Claude. *A Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Longman Inc., 1981.
- Akukwe, Chinua. "Africa, Nepad, and the G-8." *World Press Review*. 49, no. 10 (2002): 8.
- Alden, Chris, The International African Institute, and The African Royal Society. *China in Africa, African Arguments*. London; New York; Capetown, South Africa; New York: Zed Books ; David Philip ; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- All African Students, Conference, B. F. Bankie, and K. J. McHombu. *Pan-Africanism/African Nationalism : Strengthening the Unity of Africa and Its Diaspora*, All African Students Conference. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2005.
- Amin, Samir. *Afrique: Exclusion Programmée Ou Renaissance*. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005.
- . *Maldevelopment : Anatomy of a Global Failure*, Studies in African Political Economy. Tokyo; London; Atlantic Highlands, N.J., USA: United Nations University Press ; Zed Books, 1990.
- Amoako, K. Y. "Systemwatch - Nepad: Making Individual Bests a Continental Norm." *UN chronicle*. 40, no. 1 (2003): 25.
- Arnold, Guy. *A Guide to African Political & Economic Development*. London; Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001.
- Assidon, Elsa. *Les Théories Économiques Du Développement*, Collection Repères, 108. Paris: la Découverte, 1992.

- Baker, B. *Escape from Domination in Africa: Political Disengagement & Its Consequences*. Africa World Pr, 2001.
- Baldwin, David A. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism : The Contemporary Debate*, New Directions in World Politics. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993.
- BBC. "Senegal Admits Imf 'Money Gift' " In *BBC News*. London: BBC, 2009.
- Berg, Robert J., Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Strategies Committee on African Development, Relations Council on Foreign, and Council Overseas Development. *Strategies for African Development : A Study for the Committee on African Development Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Bernhard, Michael, Christopher Reenock, and Timothy Nordstrom. "The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival." *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (2004): 225-50.
- Bienefeld, Manfred. "The Lessons of Africa's Industrial 'Failure'." *IDS Bulletin* 16, no. 3 (1985): 69-77.
- Biggs-Davison, John Alec. *Africa--Hope Deferred*. London: Johnson, 1972.
- Biswas, Aparajita. "Nepad: Forum for Growth and Unity." *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, no. 8 (2004): 793-96.
- Blame, Ekoué. "Nepad: 'We Cannot Fail'." *New African -London- IC Magazines Limited*, no. 490 (2009): 60-61.
- Bobo, B. F. "A Research Agenda for the Nepad Initiative: A Note." *Journal of Third World Studies*. 23, no. 1 (2006): 75-86.
- Cameron, Verney Lovett. "Across Africa, Vol I." London: Daldy, Isbister & Co., 1877.
- Chautard, Sophie. *Les Dictateurs Du Xxe Siècle*, Studyrama Perspectives, 629. Levallois-Perret: Studyrama, 2006.
- Commins, Stephen K., Bank World, Los Angeles African Studies Center University of California, and Los Angeles African Studies Center Development Institute University of California. "Africa's Development Challenges and the World Bank : Hard Questions, Costly Choices." Boulder, Colo., 1988.
- Cuff, Selina. "Agoa: A Goer or a Goner?" *African Business*, no. 357 (2009): 84-85.
- Dubois, L. *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution*. Belknap Press, 2005.

- Easterly, William Russell. *The White Man's Burden Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*. New York [u.a.]: Penguin Books, 2007.
- Farmer, Brian R. *The Question of Dependency and Economic Development : A Quantitative Analysis*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999.
- Friedman, Thomas. *The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the 21st Century*. New York: Cambria, 2007.
- Geggus, DP. *Haitian Revolutionary Studies*: Indiana Univ Pr, 2002.
- Ghazvinian, John H. *Untapped : The Scramble for Africa's Oil*. Orlando: Harcourt, 2007.
- Gilpin, Robert, and Jean M. Gilpin. *Global Political Economy : Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Green, Reginald. "Imf Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Are They Technically Compatible?" *IDS Bulletin* 16, no. 3 (1985): 61-68.
- Guseh, J., and E. Oritsejafor. "The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 10, no. 1 (2009): 123-42.
- Haley, Alex. *Roots*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976.
- Halisi, CRD. "From Liberation to Citizenship: Identity and Innovation in Black South African Political Thought." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 39, no. 01 (1997): 61-85.
- Hameso, Seyoum Y. *Development, State and Society : Theories and Practice in Contemporary Africa*. San Jose: Authors Choice Press, 2001.
- Hanson, Stephanie. "The African Growth Act." *Council on Foreign Relations* (2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/17815/african_growth_and_opportunity_act.html.
- Harris, Cole. "How Did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 94, no. 1 (2004): 165-82.
- Holden, Matthew. *The White Man's Burden*. New York: Chandler Pub. Co., 1973.
- Hope, Kempe R. *The Dynamics of Development and Development Administration, Contributions in Economics and Economic History*, No. 56. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984.

- Ilorah, Richard. "Nepad: The Need and Obstacles." *African Development Review* 16, no. 2 (2004): 223-51.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy : The Human Development Sequence." Cambridge University Press, <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip052/2004024333.html>.
- International Trade Administration, Department of commerce. "U.S - African Trade Profile." Department of Commerce, http://agoa.gov/resources/US_African_Trade_Profile_2009.pdf.
- Jabbara, Joseph G., and O. P. Dwivedi. *Administrative Culture in a Global Context*. Whitby, Ont.: de Sitter Publications, 2005.
- Joly, Eva, and Judith Perrignon. *La Force Qui Nous Manque*. Paris: Arènes, 2007.
- Joseph, Richard A., and Alexandra Gillies. *Smart Aid for African Development*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009.
- Kabou, Axelle. *Et Si L'Afrique Refusait Le Développement*. Condé-sur-Noireau: L'Harmattan, 1991.
- Kankwenda, M. "Forty Years of Development Illusions: Revisiting Development Policies and Practices in Africa." *Onimode, Bade et al. African Development and Governance Strategies in the 21st Century: Looking Back to Move Forward: Essays in honour of Adebayo Adedeji at Seventy*. London: Zed Books (2004).
- Kéfi, Walid. "Joseph Stiglitz: «L'Afrique Doit Compter Davantage Sur Elle-Même»." *Les Afriques*, 2010.
- Kusimba, Chapurukha M. "Archaeology of Slavery in East Africa." *The African Archaeological Review* 21, no. 2 (2004): 59-88.
- Labouret, Henri. "France's Colonial Policy in Africa." *Journal of the Royal African Society* 39, no. 154 (1940): 22-35.
- Le Billon, Philippe, and The International Institute for Strategic Studies. *Fuelling War Natural Resources and Armed Conflict*. Abingdon: Published by Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2005.
- Lomax, Louis E. *The Reluctant African*. New York: Harper, 1960.
- Loxley, John. "Imperialism & Economic Reform in Africa: What's New About the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad)?" *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 95 (2003): 119-28.

- M. Makinda, Samuel, and F. Wafula Okumu. *The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance*. New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Maathai, Wangari. *The Challenge for Africa*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2009.
- MacKenzie, John M. *The Partition of Africa, 1880-1900 and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*, Lancaster Pamphlets. London; New York: Methuen, 1983.
- Magloire, G. "Ambassadors at Dawn: Haitian Thinkers in the French Colonial Context of the 19th and 20th Centuries: The Example of Jean Price-Mars (1876--1969)." New York University, 2005.
- Mazrui, Ali Al'Amin, Christophe Wondji, and The Unesco International Scientific Committee for the Drafting of a General History of Africa. *General History of Africa. Vol. 8, Africa since 1935*. Paris; Oxford; Berkeley, Calif: Unesco ; James Currey ; University of California Press, 1998.
- Mercer, Claire, Ben Page, and Martin Evans. *Development and the African Diaspora : Place and the Politics of Home*. London; New York: Zed Books, 2008.
- Michel, Serge, Michel Beuret, and Paolo Woods. *China Safari : On the Trail of Beijing's Expansion in Africa*. New York: Nation Books, 2009.
- Mills, Greg, and Foundation Heritage. *Ten Things That Africa Can Do for Itself*, Heritage Lectures, No. 923. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2006.
- Mkandawire, P. Thandika. *African Intellectuals : Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender, and Development*. New York: Zed Books, 2003.
- Moyo, Dambisa. *Dead Aid : Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.
- Nelufule, Avhafarei Alpheus, and Colorado State University. Dept. of Economics. "Africa Growth and Opportunity Act in the Context of Southern African Development Community : Fdi, Trade, Regionalism and Economic Growth." 2005.
- Niikando, Andrew. "Pan Africanism and the African Diaspora: A Weak Cooperation in the Current International Arena." In *Pan-Africanism/African Nationalism : Strengthening the Unity of Africa and Its Diaspora*. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2008.
- Nyang'Oro, J. "Africa Growth Opportunity Act: Real Partnership Or "Old Wine in New Bottles"?" *Cooperation South 2* (2000).

- Okpewho, Isidore, and Nkiru Nzegwu. *The New African Diaspora*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
- Olukoshi, Adebayo O., and Afrikainstitutet Nordiska. *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa*. Uppsala; Stockholm: Nordic Africa Institute (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet) ; Almqvist & Wiksell International [distributör], 1998.
- Oye, Kenneth A. *Cooperation under Anarchy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Pakenham, Thomas. *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912*. New York: Avon Books, 1992.
- Picard, Louis A., Michele Garrity, and The International Institute of Administrative Sciences. *Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Africa : The Institutional Imperative*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994.
- Picciotto, Robert, and Rachel Weaving. *Impact of Rich Countries' Policies on Poor Countries : Towards a Level Playing Field in Development Cooperation*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004.
- Poku, Nana K., and Jeggan Colley Senghor. *Towards Africa's Renewal*. Aldershot, Hampshire [u.a.]: Ashgate, 2007.
- Prebisch, Raúl. "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries." *The American Economic Review* 49, no. 2 (1959): 251-73.
- Prudence. "Should I Sleep with the Nanny?" *Slate Magazine*, Thursday, March 4, 2010, at 6:44 AM ET available at: <http://www.slate.com/id/2246592> 2010.
- Rabah Arezki, and Markus Brückner. "Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions." (2009).
- Riddell, Barry. "Nepad and the Future of Economic Policy in Africa (Review)." *African Studies Review* 51, no. 3 (2008): 207-09.
- Rideout, Philip M., and House Newbury. "Heinle's Newbury House Dictionary of American English." Boston, MA: Thomson/Heinle, 2004.
- Rodney, Walter. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publ. [u.a.], 1973.
- Rostow, W. W. "The Stages of Economic Growth." *The Economic History Review* 12, no. 1 (1959): 1-16.

- Rutten, M. M. E. M., Andre Leliveld, and D. Foeken. *Inside Poverty and Development in Africa : Critical Reflections on Pro-Poor Policies*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008.
- Sachs, Jeffrey. *The End of Poverty : Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. "Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies." *J Afr Econ* 6, no. 3 (1997): 335-76.
- Sassen, Saskia. *Globalization and Its Discontents : [Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money]*. New York: New Press, 1998.
- Schiffrin, Anya. "Moyo Joins the Frey." *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* X, no. Number 1 (Winter/Spring) (2009).
- Shaxson, Nicholas. *Poisoned Wells : The Dirty Politics of African Oil*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2002.
- Strang, David. *Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987*. S.l.: [s.n.], 1991.
- Summers, Della. "Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English." Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education, 2005.
- Taylor, Ian. *Nepad : Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.
- . "Partnership through Accommodation? The Tensions between The "Africa-Owned" Development Initiatives and Universal Policy Prescriptions." (2005), http://eadi.org/gc2005/confweb/papersps/Ian_Taylor.pdf.
- Taylor, Ian. "Nepad Ignores the Fundamental Politics of Africa." *Contemporary Review*, no. 1662 (2004): 29-32.
- Unesco, and The Ichs International Committee of Historical Sciences. *Des Frontières En Afrique Du Xiie Au Xxe Siecle : Bamako, 1999*. Paris: Unesco, 2005.
- United States. *An Act to Authorize a New Trade and Investment Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, Expand Trade Benefits to the Countries in the Caribbean Basin, Renew the Generalized System of Preferences, and Reauthorize the Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O. : Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., distributor, 2000.
- United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on, Africa. *The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline : A New Model for Natural Resource*

Development : Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, April 18, 2002. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. [Congressional Sales Office], 2002.

Walle, Nicola Van de. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979 - 1999.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Ward, Haskell G. *African Development Reconsidered : New Perspectives from the Continent.* New York: Phelps-Stokes Institute, 1989.

Wiseman, JA. *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa:* Burns & Oates, 1995.

Wrong, Michela. *I Didn't Do It for You: How the World Used and Abused a Small African Nation.* London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005.

Zezeza, Paul Tiyaambe. "The Academic Diaspora and Knowledge Production in and on Africa: What Role for Codeseria?" In *African Intellectuals : Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender, and Development.* Dakar: Zed Books, 2003.

———. "Diaspora Dialogues: Engagement between Africa and Its Diaspora." In *The New African Diaspora.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

VITA

Guelmbaye Ngarsandje
 Graduate Program in International Studies Department
 BAL 620
 Old Dominion University
 Norfolk, VA 23529 – 0086

EDUCATION

2010	Master of Arts in International Studies: concentration track International Political Economy	Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, U.S.A
2008	English as a Second Language Certificate	Western Illinois University, Macomb, IL, U.S.A
2004	Maitrise in Economics	University of N'Djamena, N'Djamena – Chad
2001	Bachelor in Economics	University of N'Djamena, N'Djamena – Chad
2000	Associate Degree in Economic and Management Techniques	University of N'Djamena, N'Djamena – Chad

HONORS

2008 – 2010 Fulbright Scholarship

EXPERIENCE

2009 – 2010	Intern	NATO Civil – Military Fusion Center, Norfolk, Virginia – U.S.A
2006 – 2008	Project coordinator	United Nations Development Program, N'Djamena – Chad
2005 – 2007	Civil servant agent	Chadian Ministry of Infrastructure, N'Djamena – Chad
2002 – 2006	Program manager	Cellule de Liaison et d'Information des Associations Féminines, N'Djamena - Chad

ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP

AUF Entrepreneurship researchers network
 Youth red cross